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ABSTRACT 
 The likelihood of cooperative relationships between Mexican drug cartels and Al 
Qaeda’s core or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a matter of debate and U.S. 
national security. Despite the significance of the issue, the topic is widely void of 
objective analysis. When analyzed and compared, the organizational attributes of strategy 
toward the United States, group identity, ideology, and decision-making authority show 
stark differences between these groups. With these organizational attributes established 
and then placed in the context of what makes cooperative relationships work within the 
private sector, cooperation between groups emerges as highly unlikely. While the 
occurrence of a relationship between these groups is doubtful, if it were to occur, the 
implications to U.S. national security could be catastrophic. As such, this thesis 
concludes with a policy recommendation that the United States must continue to publicly 
monitor the potential relationships to deter them. 
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I. FRAMING THE ISSUE 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to answer the question: What conditions, if any, could result in 
operational cooperation between Mexican drug cartels and Al Qaeda’s core (AQ) or The 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 
This thesis identifies conditions, if any, that could result in operational cooperation 
between Mexican drug cartels and Islamic transnational terrorist groups. Historically, some 
governmental organizations and the media have speculated on this topic because of 
oversimplified use of terminology and a lack of understanding of how such factors as 
organizational identity and intra-group trust, strategy, ideology, and organizational 
structure influence violent sub-state groups’ decision-making. Admittedly, a proven nexus 
between narcotics and terrorism does exist in some countries at some times; however, this 
does not imply a direct cooperative relationship between these organizations everywhere. 
Narco-terrorism has been argued to be both a means and an end, which further 
confuses what narco-terrorism is and where a nexus between the two exist—as well as if 
that nexus is a cooperative relationship. Peruvian counter drug units first coined narco-
terrorism in 1983 as a descriptor for the use of terror tactics by drug organizations.1 The 
United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) now defines narco-terrorism as 
“participation of groups or associated individuals in taxing, providing security for, 
otherwise aiding or abetting drug trafficking endeavors in an effort to further, or fund 
terrorist activities.”2 Notably, the Peruvian description is referring to narco-terrorism as an 
ends, and the DEA is referring to narco-terrorism as a means, which represents the 
confluence of narco-trafficking and terrorism. Looking at case studies of narco-terrorism 
                                                 
1 Jonas Hartelius, Narcoterrorism (Policy Paper 3/2008) (Stockholm, Sweden and New York, NY: 
EastWest Institute and the Swedish Carnegie Institute, 2008), 1. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/90550/2008-
02-20_Narcoterrorism.pdf. 
2 Hartelius, Narcoterrorism (Policy Paper 3/2008), 2. 
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provides no additional clarity on the topic of what narco-terrorism actually is, as it can be 
explained as both a means and an end.  
For example, Mexican drug cartels have used terrorism as an end. From 2010–2012, 
the cartels detonated 21 car bombs with the objective of targeting police.3 In addition, 
Mexican drug cartels regularly conduct beheadings and dismemberment of enemies for 
propaganda4 purposes, a method that bears a striking resemblance to the modus operandi 
of ISIS. While these examples represent using terrorism as an end, political motivation is 
absent, which, as I will demonstrate later, is a critical component to actual terrorist 
organizations.  
Conversely, both the Taliban and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC) have well-known relationships within the drug trade. The Taliban’s involvement 
in the heroin trade has created an environment where commanders are more interested in 
the drug market than their ideological motivations.5 Additionally, the FARC has been cited 
as generating between $2.4 and $3.5 billion annually in cocaine revenue.6 The previous 
examples highlight the complexity of the issue. Due to this, Mullins and Wither warn that 
“it is essential that we do not over-generalize” and the nuanced relationship between 
terrorist and criminal organizations and behavior presents significant challenges to law 
enforcement agencies and counter terrorism efforts.7 
Miller and Damask describe the relationship between the narcotics trade and 
terrorism as a “prima-facie” myth in which the concept exceeds its “precise and even 
operational definitions” that has historically served the agendas of both the George H. W. 
Bush and Reagan administrations.8 By 1986, under the Reagan administration, several U.S. 
officials warned that, “America’s porous borders have become an open invitation to world 
                                                 
3 Sam Mullins and James K. Wither, “Terrorism and Organized Crime,” Connections: Quarterly 
Journal 15, no. 3 (2016): 73.  
4 Mullins and Wither, “Terrorism and Organized Crime,” 70.  
5 Mullins and Wither, 74.  
6 Mullins and Wither, 74.  
7 Mullins and Wither, 77.  
8 Abraham H. Miller and Nicholas A. Damask, “The Dual Myths of ‘Narco-Terrorism’: How Myths 
Drive Policy,” Terrorism and Political Violence 8, no. 1 (1996): 114, doi: 10.1080/09546559608427336. 
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terrorists” and narco-terrorism was increasing.9 Specifically, U.S. Customs Commissioner 
William von Raab stated that “Mexican law-enforcement officials are being corrupted by 
drug smugglers” and that “law enforcement can just as easily be bought by terrorists.”10 
By 2000, Robert Charles, the former chief of staff for U.S. House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Government Reform’s subcommittee on national security, and manager of 
the House Speaker’s Task Force for a Drug-Free America,11 referred to the relationship of 
terrorism and drug smugglers as, “a hedonistic marriage of design...These groups are now 
linked at the hip, and they are extremely wealthy.”12 Though this opinion is from 2000, 
recent media coverage from the current Trump Administration confirms that this belief has 
not changed in recent years and the topic of operational cooperation between Mexican drug 
cartels and transnational Islamic terrorist groups, particularly AQ or ISIS remains debated 
and politicized. In a recent reflection on the Obama administration, White House Chief of 
Staff,13 John Kelly recalled that cooperative relationships between terrorist and drug cartels 
were “bad for business” in the eyes of the cartels.14 Yet, under the Trump administration, 
the potential for these same cooperative relationships are “what keeps him up at night.”15 
Lastly, cooperation is often broadly referred to, but rarely defined during discussion of the 
topic. As noted by Mullins and Wither, “there is still ongoing disagreement about the extent 
of overlap between the worlds of terrorism and organized crime.”16 Both White House 
Chief of Staff John Kelly17 and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson have been reported as 
                                                 
9 John Dillin, “Spies, Terrorists & U.S. Border,” Christian Science Monitor, March 24, 1986, 1. 
10 Dillin, “Spies, Terrorists & U.S. Border,”1. 
11 John G. Roos, “The Enemy Next Door,” Armed Forces International (March 2000): 40. 
12 Roos, “The Enemy Next Door,” 40. 
13 At the time of John Kelly’s comments, he was serving as the United States Secretary of Homeland 
Security 
14 David Sherfinski and Stephen Dinan, “Smuggling by International Crime Syndicates Is What Keeps 
Homeland Security Chief up at Night,” The Washington Times, April 18, 2017, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/apr/18/john-kelly-smuggling-cartels-major-threat/.  
15 Sherfinski and Dinan, “Smuggling by International Crime Syndicates Is What Keeps Homeland 
Security Chief Up at Night.”  
16 Mullins and Wither, “Terrorism and Organized Crime,” 65.  
17 At the time of John Kelly’s comments, he was serving as the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security 
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confirming ties and connections between terrorist and criminal networks.18 The DEA has 
also reported that of the 43 listed foreign terrorist organizations, 19 of them have known 
ties to drug trafficking organizations.19 
Juxtaposed to this, in 2008, Charles Allen, the Homeland undersecretary for 
intelligence and analysis reported that “we know of no trained al Qaeda operatives who 
have crossed over our southern border,” as well as, “We do know that going back to 2004, 
the southern border is something that Al Qaeda’s central leadership has looked at. But we 
know of no specifics of where Al Qaeda has really endeavored to cross our borders in the 
south.”20 Additionally, as of 2009, research by Lanzante notes that 50% (5 out of 10) 
homeland security officials he interviewed regarding cooperative relationships between 
drug trafficking organizations and terrorist organizations did not believe that the two 
organizations would engage in a relationship, as no empirical evidence has been observed 
by them to substantiate a relationship.21 Miller and Damask provide a possible explanation 
by suggesting that this overlap is far more “tangential and ephemeral” than some 
individuals are willing to accept.22 Additionally, the media implies the relationship as being 
cooperative.23 This is not necessarily the case, ties and connections can be “cooperative, 
exploitative or competitive; short or long-term; small or large scale; voluntary or 
involuntary; direct or indirect; deliberate or unwitting.”24 The lack of precise language has 
left the topic highly subjective, and void of methodical analysis to ascertain the likelihood 
of meaningful cooperative relationships between Mexican drug cartels and transnational 
                                                 
18 Elena Toledo, “US Government Confirms Connection between Mexican Drug Cartels and ISIS,” 
PANAMPOST, June 15, 2017, https://panampost.com/elena-toledo/2017/06/15/us-government-confirms-
connection-between-mexican-drug-cartels-and-isis/ 
19 Douglas Farah, “Fixers, Super Fixers and Shadow Facilitators: How Networks Connect,” 
(Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, accessed August 18, 2017), 2, 
http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/Articles/Fixers_Super-
Fixers_and_Shadow_Facilitators_Farah.pdf. 
20 Randall Mikkelsen, “No Signs of Qaeda at U.S.-Mexican Border: Official,” Reuters, April 11, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-security-usa-qaeda-idUSN1115689520080411 
21 Joseph Lanzante, “The Relationship between Criminal and Terrorist Organizations and Human 
Smuggling” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009). 
22 Miller and Damask, “The Dual Myths of ‘Narco-Terrorism’: How Myths Drive Policy,” 114-115. 
23 Toledo, “US Government Confirms Connection between Mexican Drug Cartels and ISIS.” 
24 Mullins and Wither, “Terrorism and Organized Crime,” 71.  
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Islamic terrorist organizations such as AQ or ISIS. Similar to the three preceding decades, 
the extent of cooperation between Mexican drug cartels and transnational terrorist groups 
remains inconclusive, yet its relevance to national security has not waned. 
Aside from the political debate, the nature of the identities of ISIS or AQ and 
Mexican drug cartels present conflicting perspectives of the likelihood of cooperation 
between the two groups. The motivations of the groups suggest that cooperation is unlikely; 
however, the structure of the organizations suggests that cooperation is possible. While 
both want to make money, material incentives motivate cartels, and violence is meant “to 
protect themselves and their illicit enterprises from being shut down.”25 Conversely, non-
material incentives motivate transnational Islamic terrorist groups and the existence of 
relationships to drug organizations could degrade their strategic narrative and popular 
support. As stated by Dishman, “terrorist groups are reluctant to cooperate with narcotics 
syndicates, cognizant that any involvement in drug trafficking – and especially enduring 
cooperation with a narcotics syndicate – would fuel state campaigns aiming to poison the 
terrorists’ image.”26 Lastly, despite the risk associated with it, research conducted by 
Phillips of 41 terrorist groups with known relationships to drug trafficking showed that this 
relationship does not increase the group’s likelihood of survivability.27 Based on these 
observations, the organizational agendas of both groups makes the relationship counter-
intuitive, difficult to assess, and subject to speculation.  
Despite motivational differences, similar structures of cartels and transnational 
terrorist organizations may explain why cooperative relationships between terrorist and 
narco activities may have emerged in recent history and have become of increasing 
concern. Both cartels and terrorist organizations have adopted more networked approaches 
to organizational structure, which has increased autonomy among lower levels.28 
According to Picarelli, “networked forms of organization are giving criminals and terrorists 
                                                 
25 Mullins and Wither, “Terrorism and Organized Crime,” 70.  
26 Chris Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24, no. 1 
(2001): 46, doi: 10.1080/10576100118879.  
27 Brian J. Phillips, “How Terrorist Organizations Survive: Cooperation and Competition in Terrorist 
Group Networks” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2012): 69, 87.  
28 Mullins and Wither, “Terrorism and Organized Crime,” 65–82, 69. 
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greater opportunity, and motive, for collaborating with one another.”29 Although 
advantages may be present, they do come at some cost and creates what has been referred 
to as the terrorist’s dilemma.30 This dilemma occurs when a terrorist organization shifts to 
a decentralized structure, thus losing the ability to command and control their cells.31 With 
this in mind, the author assesses that the potential for cooperation increases yet it remains 
unknown whether the ties and connections between Mexican drug cartels and transnational 
Islamic terrorist groups such as AQ or ISIS, reported as existing, represent individual 
decisions or official sanctioned behaviors. 
In conclusion, the high level of ambiguity in terminology, the absence of a 
convincing explanations for cooperation, and the inability to distinguish organizational 
from individual actions degrades the ability to determine the conditions that would result 
in operational cooperation between a AQ and ISIS and a Mexican drug cartel. To achieve 
results based on empirical data and logic of this likelihood, this thesis provides academic 
rigor and a methodical approach to the problem—which have been absent to date.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
Critical to the understanding of the likelihood for cooperative relationships to occur 
between Mexican drug cartels and AQ or ISIS are three foundational categories of 
information that require research. These three focus areas are: (a) an understanding of the 
problems associated with the generation and maintenance of operational momentum that 
are inherent to criminal enterprises—mobilization (b) commonalities and differences in the 
organizational structures of criminal groups, (c) the positive and negative implications of 
                                                 
29 John T. Picarelli, “Osama bin Corleone? Vito the Jackal? Framing Threat Convergence through an 
Examination of Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 24, no. 2 (March 2012): 186, doi: 10.1080/09546553.2011.648349.  
30 Jacob N. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2013), 22; David Tucker, “Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy: Why the 
Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong,” Homeland Security Affairs 4, no. 5 (June 2008):11–8. 
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/122. 
31 Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations, 22. ; Tucker, 
“Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy: Why the Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong,”11–8. 
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establishing cooperative relationships between criminal groups—alliances. The review of 
literature on these three categories of information includes scholarly publications, press 
articles, government reports and military doctrinal publications on terrorism, a limited 
number of primary source documents available through the exploitation of documents 
captured from terrorist organizations, as well as the adaptation of theories on business 
alliances to fit the framework of criminal enterprises. Additionally, the majority of 
available resources concerning cooperative relationships center on terrorist organizations; 
however, this literature is widely applicable to Mexican drug cartels. Since both 
organizations are illegal in nature and must be self-reliant opposed to the ability to leverage 
formal institutions to govern their behavior, relationships, or operations similarities exist. 
While all categories are interrelated, the subsequent literature review discusses each 
independently. 
2. Commonalities in Concerns with Mobilization—Differences in the 
Means of Mitigation   
Criminal organizations (to include drug cartels and terrorist organizations) like 
most organizations need to cultivate the continued mobilization of resources in order to 
remain competitive within their arena. By analogy, terrorist campaigns have been described 
as being “like a shark in the water: it must keep moving forward—no matter how slowly 
or incrementally—or die.”32 This same descriptor could be used for Mexican drug cartels 
and AQ or ISIS alike given that they often operate in competitive environments in which 
maintaining an edge over rivals is an imperative. As one example, Stanford University’s 
work on mapping militant groups notes that the ISIS has competitive relationships and 
rivalries with the Free Syrian Army, Ansar al Islam, The Islamic Front, Tahrir al-Sham, 
and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.33 In the case of Mexican drug cartels, the 
Congressional Research Service, as of 2017, suggests that between nine and twenty drug 
trafficking organizations are competing for market share creating an environment far “more 
                                                 
32 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Revised and Expanded Edition, (New York: Colombia University 
Press, 2006), 234.  




competitive than in the past.”34 A common denominator for criminal enterprises, terrorist 
organizations and drug cartels alike, due to the competitive and illegal environment in 
which they operate in is that they must continuously mobilize resources.  
Multiple authors from a variety of different backgrounds have published material 
on the importance of the mobilization of resources in order to sustain armed groups to 
achieve their desired end states.35 Some of these authors focus their research and analysis 
on specific areas of mobilization; however, the key resources that require mobilization are: 
(a) people with the will to participate, (b) means that achieve organizational goals (to 
include money and material), and (c) leadership through command and control to provide 
strategic direction.36  
3. Human Resource Mobilization 
Mexican drug cartels and transnational terrorist groups diverge in mobilization 
through member’s incentives. AQ and ISIS use non-material incentives to mobilize people 
and resources; this is not to say that money is absent, rather that monetary gain does not 
motivate members. For example, Al-Qaeda in Iraq based their structure for monetary 
compensation around basic needs of individuals and their family size as opposed to position 
and performance of responsibilities.37 According to Waldmann, the true motivation of 
ethnic terrorist is “a real or fictive threat to the ethnic group (ethnic, religious, or regional) 
because of a directly experienced threat to that group.”38 Additionally, transnational 
Islamic terrorist organizations must maintain a connection and relevancy within the 
                                                 
34 June S. Beittel, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations (CRS Report No. 
R41576) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), 10, 24. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf. 
35 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Michigan: University of Michigan, 1977), 
https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/50931/156.pdf; Central Intelligence Agency, The 
Supporters of International Terrorism (1981), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP84B00274R000100040012-9.pdf; Anthony Vinci, “The ‘Problems of Mobilization’ and  
The Analysis of Armed Groups,” Parameters 36, no. 1 (2006); Phillips, “How Terrorist Organizations 
Survive: Cooperation and Competition in Terrorist Group Networks.”  
36 Vinci, “The ‘Problems of Mobilization’ and the Analysis of Armed Groups,” 51.  
37 Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations, 111. 
38 Peter Waldmann, “Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures,” 
International Social Movement Research 4 (1992): 244. 
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community in which they represent as “they rely on the support and sympathy of great 
percentage of the populace who share the terrorists’ ambitions.”39 In the case of a drug 
cartel, while concerned with brand image and popular perception, the organization does 
not rely on ideological alignment with its members. On the other hand, drug cartels 
mobilize people through material incentive and the hope for future gain. While being 
interviewed by Smith, Nieto-Gomez observed that aspiration and ambition to achieve the 
prosperity of drug cartel kingpins is a high-level motivator for individuals to participate in 
and support drug cartel operations, regardless of the risk associated with it.40  
In summary, cartels can be destroyed by competition and state sponsored counter-
drug operations, but the global demand for drugs seems to sustain them, whereas, terrorist 
organizations can be destroyed through competition, counter-terrorism operations, but also 
from their ideological motivations fizzling out among members. Several key components 
regarding the nature of mobilizing people come to light in the review of this literature and 
are as follows: (a) Illegal sub-state actors operate in a competitive environment that 
demands continued mobilization to protect against organizational collapse, (b) While both 
Mexican drug cartels and AQ or ISIS must contend with issues in the mobilization of 
personnel, their tools of motivation vary, (c) based on the tools used to mobilize personnel 
a level in divergence between the groups’ behaviors is observable. 
Additionally, based on how these groups manage issues with mobilization of 
personnel resources it is worthwhile to examine different types of business models. The 
terrorist organization could be classified as a non-profit group as opposed to a Mexican 
drug cartel that could be classified as a for profit organization, the distinct delineation 
between the two being:  
A business or other organization whose primary goal is making money (a 
profit), as opposed to a non profit organization which focuses a goal such 
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as helping the community and is concerned with money only as much as 
necessary to keep the organization operating.41 
Given the path divergence between transnational terrorist organizations and 
Mexican drug cartels, the question remains whether these two organizations can overcome 
mobilization differences to achieve cooperative relationships.  
4. Capital Mobilization  
This issue of revenue generation/mobilization must also be addressed with regard 
to commonalities and differences between Mexican drug cartels and transnational Islamic 
Terrorist organizations. Both criminal organizations rely on multiple organizational 
funding streams that generally mirror each other. Mexican drug cartels have been described 
as becoming “poly-crime” organizations, given that in addition to the drug trade, they now 
engage in criminal activity such as kidnapping, assassinations, grand theft auto, human 
smuggling, and grand larceny.42 Transnational terrorist organizations generate revenue in 
two categories: the first being gray economies defined as the “combination of licit and 
illicit activities perpetrated by terrorist and insurgent groups for monetary gain” including: 
diaspora support, charities, fraud, legal business, and money laundering;43 the second being 
a dark economy defined as “entirely illicit and illegal, with little room for interpretation” 
including: kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery and theft, smuggling, drug trafficking 
and counterfeiting, and extortion.44 Where the divergent characteristics in monetary 
mobilization emerge is the need for AQ or ISIS to guard against how their popular support 
base will react to their activities. Substantiating this claim, Waldman as well as an 
intelligence assessment published by the CIA support the idea that terrorist must guard 
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against how the sources of their monetary mobilization will be perceived by their support 
base.45  
 Lastly, the role of leadership and command and control in the context of 
mobilization will be discussed within the following section as it largely pertains to the 
organizational structure adopted by the criminal organization itself.  
5. Organizational Structure in Relation to Command and Control and 
Strategic Direction 
Two primary criminal structures exist common to both cartels and terrorists groups, 
each having characteristics that provide advantages and disadvantages to the organization: 
the hierarchy and the network. The base unit of both design structures is the cell46; however, 
the characteristics and responsibility of the cell vary based on the organizational structure 
adopted by the terrorist organization. According to A Military Guide to Terrorism in the 
Twenty-First Century, hierarchical structures “have a well-defined vertical chain of 
command, control, and responsibility” in which command and control flows vertically 
within the organization without a requirement to move horizontally between organizational 
cells.47 Cell structure provides specialization for the overall organization, and the cell 
leader is typically the only one who communicates with adjacent cells or higher echelons 
of command within the organizational structure.48 Networked organizations, on the other 
hand, operate under a decentralized model of command and control which limit 
communications between cells and higher echelons of command. Cells operate with a level 
of autonomy basing operations on the intent rather than the order of a higher command.49 
Within a network structure, the inherent autonomy of the cells makes the cells less 
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specialized as all aspects of organizational functions are integral to the cell itself.50 The 
greatest delineation between the two models is the frequency of contact between the 
subordinate cells and the legitimate authorities of command.51 
The topic of covert organizational structure remains debated. Kenny describes drug 
trafficking and terrorist organizations structures as highly networked, characterized by 
having flat authority, quick information dissemination and decision making cycles.52 Yet 
authors such as Tucker refute this by showing that prior to 9/11, Al Qaeda was hierarchical 
in structure and that not all nodes had equal authority.53 Additionally, primary source 
documents recovered from the Bin Laden raid in Pakistan seem to support at least some 
level of hierarchy even after 9/11 given that subordinate nodes continued to seek direction 
from senior leadership.54 Organizations such as ISIS tend to be thought of as highly 
networked, given the expansiveness of their operations, yet much like Al Qaeda, its 
organizational structure distinctly includes hierarchy and bureaucracy. Its structure starts 
with Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi at the top and breaks down into eleven different structures 
each with a different functional area of responsibility.55 Within this structure, the Security 
and Intelligence Council serves as the conduit to provide “directives from the Central 
Leadership team and Caliph.”56 Despite this structure, some of the behaviors still point to 
some levels of autonomy. Salman Abedi who attacked patrons of the Ariana Grande 
concert on 22 May 2017 in the Manchester Arena, UK was reported as affiliated with ISIL 
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leading up to the moments before the attack.57 Despite this, the author has been unable to 
identify any information that suggests Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi directed this attack. 
Furthermore, postponing the attack to target UK election polls a little more than a week 
later would seem to nest better with ISIL narrative suggesting decentralization in 
organizational design. 
The organizational structure of drug cartels is as murky as terrorist organizations. 
Natajaran, whose research relied heavily on analysis of wiretap conversations, states that 
“the analysis confirmed that the organization was of the ‘corporate’ type, involving a large 
number of individuals, clear division of labor and a recognizable hierarchy.”58 Yet in 
contrast to this, Benson, whose research relied on the interviewing of incarcerated 
individuals associated with drug smuggling operations, suggests that evidence supports a 
notion that “drug smugglers work in groups that are horizontal rather than vertical. That is, 
orders or commands seldom come from a centralized authority communicated down an 
organizational structure.”59  
In determining which organization model drug cartels, AQ, and ISIS employ, it is 
worth looking at what effects the disruption of central leadership played on these 
organizations. Since the death of Osama Bin Laden on May 2011, Al Qaeda Central has 
not achieved any high profile attacks (that the author is aware of) that can be attributed to 
the organization. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s declaration as the Caliph sparked an 
unprecedented amount of foreign fighters going to Iraq and Syria to support jihad.60 Lastly, 
the capture and extradition of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman appears to have created a power 
vacuum within the Sinaloa Cartel and sparked significant violence for control of the drug 
                                                 
57 Nicola Harley and Adam Nathan, “Manchester Bomber Was ‘Controlled by ISIL Group behind Paris 
Attacks,” The Telegraph, June 3, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/03/manchester-bomber-
controlled-isil-group-behind-paris-attacks/. 
58 Mangai Natarajan, “Understanding The Structure of a Drug Trafficking Organization: A 
Conversational Analysis,” Crime Prevention Studies 11, (2000): 273.  
59 Jana S. Benson and Scott Decker, “The Organizational Structure of International Drug Smuggling,” 
Journal of Criminal Justice 38, (2010): 136.  




market share.61 While these organizations all may have characteristics that suggest that 
they are highly networked, the role and significance of central leadership within the 
organizational structure cannot be dismissed. Rather than prescribing a hierarchical or 
networked model to these organizations, the author suggests an alternative model that may 
provide insight into criminal organizational structure. Borrowing terminology from the 
corporate sector, drug cartels and terrorist organizations may operate as holacratic 
organizations. This organizational structure, as described by Robertson (the individual who 
coined the organizational structure), is an organizational structure that exist in “a 
framework of rules and free actors within that framework are able to go do whatever makes 
sense to them to do their work.”62 If applied to illegal covert organizations, cells have the 
autonomy to make their own decisions based on the function they serve; however, they still 
remain committed to the organization’s direction, identity, and leadership. By these terms, 
the attributes of a network and hierarchy are apparent. 
In conclusion, the organizational structure of Mexican drug cartels and Islamic 
Transnational Terrorist Organizations remain contentious; however, they are highly 
relevant to explain where decision-making authority resides. By understanding where 
decision-making authority resides a better understanding of a decision to cooperate 
between the two groups could emerge.  
6. The Cooperative Relationship and the Pros and Cons of Cooperating 
Before proceeding to analyze whether any conditions could create operational 
cooperation between transnational Islamic terrorist organizations such as AQ or ISIS and 
Mexican drug cartels, the parameters of criminal cooperation must be established. Yet, this 
task is inherently difficult due to definitions on cooperation within literature typically 
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focusing on state-to-state opposed to sub-state organizations. Recognizing the difficulty of 
the task, and by drawing from international relations definitions on cooperation (provided 
by Waltz and Holsti et al.), Bacon provides a succinct and manageable definition to 
establish what cooperation is and is not. As defined by Bacon, terrorist inter-group 
cooperation should be considered “as formal or informal relationships of security 
cooperation among two or more terrorist groups involving some degree of ongoing 
coordination or consultation in the future.”63 While Bacon focuses on security cooperation, 
and the author has focused on mobilization, continued mobilization represents a critical 
component of security cooperation. Moghadam provides even more granularity on the 
different forms of alliances (a term in which Bacon and Moghadam both use 
interchangeably with cooperation) stating that alliances can be categorized in four ways 
and involve a spectrum of cooperation. These typologies are mergers, strategic alliances, 
tactical cooperation, and transactional cooperation.64 It should also be noted that 
Moghadam categorizes pledges of allegiance or instances of bay’a as variations of 
transnational cooperation so long as they have not matured beyond a pledged 
relationship.65Additionally, regarding transactional cooperation, the relationship can be a 
one-time basis.66 This deviates from Bacon’s definition with regard to duration. For the 
purpose of this thesis, cooperation will combine the perspectives of both Bacon, 
Moghadam, and the author as, the knowing participation in “formal or informal 
relationships of security cooperation among two or more”67 criminal organizations 
involving either episodic or sustained “coordination or consultation”68 that provides mutual 
benefit at the organizational level. It is important to delineate that the focus of this 
definition, as well as the analysis included in this thesis, is at the organizational level. 
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Counter-arguments can always be made through cases of individual deviance from 
organizational preferences, but such analysis that provides insight into the likelihood of 
cooperative relationships must remain at the organizational level.  
Accurately defining and setting parameters has important implications because of 
the possibility of individuals interpreting and referring to a relationship as cooperation 
when it is not. As an example, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has provided 
protection to cocaine shipments originating in Latin America that have been destined for 
Europe, some may classify this as cooperation, whereas others may just simply consider 
this as extortion,69 and others may classify it as harmony where “a group’s policies and 
actions automatically facilitate the other’s goals.”70 In this particular case, using the 
definition for cooperation proposed by the author, the relationship is classified as 
cooperative. A relationship exists, and the outcome is mutually beneficial and results in 
greater mobilization for both organizations. Extortion suggests only a single party 
benefiting; however, AQIM gains financially and drug distributors gain market access, 
thereby making the relationship cooperative. 
7. Pros and Cons of Cooperation by Criminal Organizations  
On the surface, terrorist and drug related organized crime appear to have a lot in 
common. First, both operate in a covert manner, use violence as a means to achieve their 
end states, want and need access to money, and in some form or fashion, engage in 
smuggling operations.71 Second, both organizations have a transnational component, which 
presents a complex landscape that criminal or terrorist organizations cannot navigate 
without some level of support and facilitation from external individuals or organizations.72 
Third, in addition to the increased benefits in mobilizing resources, cooperative 
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relationships can be formed around a real or perceived threat of a common enemy.73 Fourth, 
if the organizations share an ideology, the smaller group of the two that is cooperating can 
adopt the “brand” of the larger organization to assist in recruitment.74 Fifth, cooperative 
relationships can increase organizational learning.75 Lastly, research by Phillips suggests 
that cooperative relationships have positive impacts on creating longevity for terrorist 
organizations.76 Of course, what drives cooperation varies greatly from organization to 
organization; however, Kanter in discussing alliances with the corporate sector sums up 
the critical components of a cooperative relationship in that: (a) they must include benefit 
to both parties, (b) create new value, and (c) require interpersonal connections.77 The 
benefit of cooperative relationships between AQ or ISIS and Mexican Cartels seems to be 
readily apparent, yet among other things mentioned above, such as how the organization 
incentivizes, the issue of trust is a critical component in making the relationship work. 
Moghadam in describing the spectrum of cooperative relationships between terrorist 
organizations references the role of trust. High-end cooperation requires a high level of 
trust; low-end cooperation requires lower levels of trust.78 Regardless of the level of 
cooperation, some level of trust must exist and this presents a significant divergence in a 
relationship between the two enterprises. Williams sums it up best with this:  
Criminals are generally pragmatic, risk averse, business oriented, and 
concerned about feeding illicit markets and deriving the profits therefrom. 
They do not want to be involved in anything that might disrupt their market. 
This logic might be particularly compelling for Latin American drug 
trafficking organizations. For their part, terrorists likely have serious 
reservations about cooperation with criminals, who are greedy, 
nonbelievers, overly pragmatic and excessively preoccupied with money. 
Moreover, for terrorists, criminals who do not share their political 
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convictions are inherently unreliable partners who might betray or exploit 
them.79 
The implications of lacking trust are significant and business literature posits that 
mistrust makes successful cooperation harder to obtain as well as the fact that because the 
organizations are different, the outsiders become highly suspect which, in turn, creates 
more distrust.80 One of the most effective ways to overcome mistrust or ensure cooperation 
is through effective communication; however, given the illicit nature of the drug and terror 
business, this presents a problem.81 With greater communication comes greater exposure 
to targeting by security forces. As is the case, drug cartels and terrorist organizations prefer 
to communicate through couriers82 which time lapse and the tyranny of distance degrade 
effectiveness. This dilemma is further exacerbated by some literature supporting that while 
drug cartels are for profit organizations, they are sometimes willing to place a premium on 
security over efficiency in decision-making processes.83 These factors seem to support 
research by Karmon that identifies geographic proximity as a key variable in determining 
the likelihood of success for a cooperative relationship between covert organizations.84 
Unfortunately for them, Mexican drug cartels and ISIS or AQ do not currently share core 
geographic areas as organizational safe havens. Given the realities of the environment that 
cartels and terror organizations operate in, what makes cooperation work, and the benefits 
and shortfalls of cooperative relationships, assessing the potential relationship between the 
two must be placed in the context of risk versus reward. To achieve cooperation, the value 
of the reward must be substantial enough to overcome the organizational differences and 
nature of cooperation.  
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The above literature review has established that transnational Islamic terrorist 
organizations, particularly AQ or ISIS and Mexican drug cartels, have some commonalities 
in their illicit nature; however, their organizational identities placed in the context of 
making cooperative relationships work vary greatly. If trust is one of the major determining 
factors, these differences will greatly impede their ability to cooperate. As such, the author 
suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1, The organizational identity factors of: strategy, ideology, and 
group unity (centered around trust), between AQ or ISIS and Mexican drug 
cartels impede the likelihood of operational cooperation between the 
groups. 
While the organizational identities of these Islamic terrorist organizations and 
Mexican drug cartels, appear to be similar in nature, showing characteristics that are both 
networked and hierarchical; both organizational structures rely on some level of central 
authority to govern organizational behavior and direction. As a result of this, the preference 
of the leadership driven decision making in organizational goals and objectives appear to 
be another source of divergence for cooperation between the two groups. In this context, 
the following hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis 2: Organizational structure decreases the likelihood of 
operational cooperation between the groups. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Answering this question presents difficulty for several reasons:(a) limited material 
available on the future intentions of Mexican drug cartels, AQ, and ISIS, (b) minimal 
documented cases of cooperation, (c) inaccuracy or manipulation of available information 
by mainstream media or special interest groups for the advancement of organizational or 
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party agendas and lastly85 (d) primary source research that draws from the cyber profiles 
of terrorist organizations presents difficulty in protecting the author’s computer from 
attribution and potential malware. Given these limitations, the research of this project will 
be done through a historical design with the intent to “collect, verify, and synthesize 
evidence from the past to establish facts that defend or refute”86 my hypotheses. Given that 
this topic is a contemporary issue and initial research suggests that both Mexican drug 
cartels and transnational Islamic terrorist groups are highly adaptive, I have taken liberties 
in defining history in which the most recent and available contemporary history on 
structural characteristics, goals, and behaviors of the groups will be utilized for supporting 
or refuting my argument. I recognize the limitations of this thesis, most notably with regard 
to a paucity of contemporary empirical evidence to support or deny the hypothesis 
presented; in many ways, this thesis explores potential cooperative scenarios based on 
subjective but supported by material on the nature of Mexican drug cartels and Islamic 
transnational terrorist organizations. Yet, by maintaining a structured approach that focuses 
on the known identities of the organizations, void of speculation or emotion, logical 
conclusions can be made regarding the potential for cooperation between these 
organizations. 
In addition to this design, I will focus on the likelihood for cooperative relations in 
regard to strategy, ideology, trust, and structure, which together is defined by me as group 
identity that feeds continuous mobilization of resources. Alternative motivations for 
cooperative relationships that have been suggested by other authors such as shared 
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enemies, or a permissive security environment will not be addressed within this thesis.87 
While issues of shared enemies or a permissive security environment may be identified 
within the analysis portion of the thesis, these factors will be considered as secondary 
factors to cooperation.  
To achieve the goals of this thesis, the author employs stakeholder analysis and 
theoretical scenarios of cooperative relationships to evaluate strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats that affect both organizations. This process of analysis fits this 
thesis for the following reasons. First, as established in the literature review, there is value 
in looking at Mexican drug cartels, AQ and ISIS through business model lenses. 
Stakeholder analysis places the historical approach of the research method in proper 
context to draw more definitive conclusions that have been void to date. Additionally, 
stakeholder analysis is a common tool used in the corporate sector for determining future 
decisions of organizations; as such, it is a logical fit.  
I hope that this thesis will inform policy makers to better develop border security 
strategies that include political signaling to Mexican drug cartels and broader Mexican/U.S. 
border security concerns. Additionally, this thesis may provide intelligence and security 
analysts a baseline for future analysis as these threat organizations evolve. Lastly, by 
opening the discussion of this topic through subjective yet scholarly work, I hope to 
cultivate new thinking and promote further exploration on classified domains on this topic 
of national security concern. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis provides the following: (a) the establishment of AQ and ISIS and 
Mexican drug cartels as rational actors in the context of their individual group identities. 
This topic has been historically controversial and debated; however, recent scholarly 
research supports the argument that both groups apply calculation and deliberate action in 
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their decision making.88 With an understanding and acceptance that both groups are 
rational in decision-making, this thesis then explores (b) what issues regarding 
organizational identities must be resolved between Mexican drug cartels and AQ or ISIS 
to achieve a cooperative relationship between groups while still maintaining operational 
momentum. Upon establishing what impediments the groups must contend with, (c) 
Mexican drug cartels and AQ or ISIS will be compared and contrasted along their 
identities, highlighting their commonalities and differences in the context of forming 
cooperative relationships. Once this comparison of identities has been firmly established, 
the thesis concludes with (d) assessing the likelihood of cooperative relationships based on 
the group identities in the form of stakeholder analysis. 
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II. THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE UNITED STATES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As demonstrated in Chapter one, organizational cooperation between Mexican drug 
cartels and al Qaeda or ISIS has become a debated topic within the United States. Broadly 
and most often, the issue of cooperation between ISIS or AQ and a Mexican drug cartel 
focus on the potential for the terrorist organizations to capitalize on the porous nature of 
the nearly 2,000 mile border between Mexico and the United States by smuggling 
operatives into the United States from the south. Despite these concerns, as of August 16, 
2017, of the 114 individuals charged in the United States for an association with the Islamic 
State, only 14 have been from states that share a physical border with Mexico.89 
Additionally, the summaries of accusations associated with their activities, provided by 
The Washington Post provide zero references to Mexico playing a role in the travel, plots, 
or activities of the suspected/convicted terrorist.90 Though empirical evidence suggests that 
cartel facilitated border crossing has not yet occurred, this speculation is not without basis. 
According to an undisclosed U.S. government official, the Los Angeles Times reported that 
Osama Bin Laden, while alive, expressed “ongoing interest to enter the United States over 
land borders with Mexico and Canada.”91 While intent by Bin Laden may have existed; 
again, no domestic attacks on the United States have been tied to a border penetration from 
Mexico.  
Given this reality, looking at how the United States fits within the strategic context 
of ISIS, AQ, and Mexican drug cartels may provide some insight as to why a cooperative 
relationship in terrorist related human smuggling operations has not yet occurred, and why 
a cooperation relationship of this nature is difficult to achieve for the groups. Chapter I has 
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argued that terrorist organizations and cartels alike mirror business organizations. 
Therefore, before proceeding, it is worth gaining an understanding of how an 
organization’s strategic outlook contributes to overarching activities, behaviors and how 
strategy effects the likelihood of creating a cooperative relationship. 
Organizational strategy can be defined as the summary of “actions you intend to 
take in order to achieve your long-term business goals.”92 In the case of cartels, the long-
term goals center along profit maximization, for AQ and ISIS, as with all terrorism, it is 
effecting political change. Strategy plays an important role in that the pillars of corporate 
success, “the best product, services, goals, and management teams are of little use without 
a corporate strategy.”93Additionally, strategy helps to establish direction and priorities, 
align members, and clarify decision-making.94 In a reflection of the value of strategy to a 
corporation and quoting Roman philosophy, “if a man does not know what port he is 
steering for, no wind is favorable.”95 In this context of both history, business, and 
clandestine groups, having a strategy for the organization represents a cornerstone of 
continued mobilization and pursuit of objectives. Lastly, business literature suggests that 
when the strategic objectives of cooperating groups closely align, this incentivizes groups 
to make the relationship work.96 
With these key concepts on the value of strategy both within an organization as 
well as between cooperating groups, the following sections argues that if ISIS or al Qaeda 
and a Mexican drug cartel were to cooperate, this relationship would represent a significant 
divergence in the organizational strategies regarding the United States for both groups. As 
such, significant departures from normative behaviors would be required to achieve 
cooperation. Additionally, as with the entire body of this thesis, the unit of analysis for this 
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argument lies at the organizational level. Counter arguments can always be made at the 
individual actor level; however, to achieve the goals of the chapter, a broader 
organizational context must be maintained. Lastly, the author does not attempt to predict 
which side would provide concessions in their group’s strategies to achieve cooperation; 
rather, the intent is to highlight that if cooperation between the two groups were achieved, 
at least one group would have to significantly depart from its normative behaviors.  
B. HOW THE UNITED STATES FITS INTO ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRATEGIES—A CLEAR DIVIDE 
For a Mexican drug cartel and ISIS or al Qaeda to cooperate, the very different role 
that the United States plays within their organizational strategies would have to be 
resolved. For a Mexican drug cartel, the United States represents a 19–29 billion-dollar 
market place,97 supported by 9.4% of the population (24.6 million people) who are illicit 
drug users.98 Additionally, because the drug money must exit the United States, cartels 
have integrated legal and conventional business into their money laundering operations. 
As an example, in 2015, the U.S. government seized 140 million dollars in cash and assets 
associated with cartel money laundering within Los Angeles’ Fashion district – money that 
was destined to return to Mexico’s Sinaloa and Knights Templar Cartels.99 Additionally, 
the Chicago Crime Commission noted that “over 90% of the marijuana, cocaine, heroin, 
methamphetamine, and other synthetic drugs that are being sold on the streets…come from 
the Sinaloa Cartel.”100 Lastly, according to a former DEA agent, who participated in over 
13 years of counter-drug operations in Mexico, Michael Vigil, the Sinaloa Cartel alone 
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operates in over 4,000 U.S. cities.101 From a financial aspect, especially for drug cartels 
who are trying to maximize their profits, the United States is an obvious linchpin in their 
strategy.  
The value that the United States has to the Mexican drug cartels exceeds financial 
benefits and includes serving as a safe haven. As an example of this, former leader of the 
drug cartel Los Zetas, Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, prior to his death, had been reported as 
using the United States as a safe haven to increase his security when pressure in Mexico 
became too high.102 In a similar fashion in 2011, the now imprisoned leader of the Sinaloa 
Cartel, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán’s wife, Emma Coronel gave birth to twin girls in Los 
Angeles County.103 As a result of protections under the 14th Amendment and her status as 
a U.S. citizen, the children are now United States’ citizens as well.104 Additionally, much 
like the Sinaloa Cartel, the Los Zetas are known to maintain familial ties within the United 
States to create safe havens and increase its distribution networks to the U.S. market.105 
While the above examples provide some context on the value that the United States 
plays within the strategies of the Cartels, a look at comparative murder rates of the adjacent 
U.S. and Mexican cities provides even stronger evidence that cartels value keeping the 
border with the United States relatively peaceful. In doing so, a logical conclusion is that 
their strategy includes an attempt to not increase pressure from the U.S. government on 
Cartels and their border operations. By comparison in 2016, Juarez Mexico experienced 
46.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, whereas, just across the border in El Paso the 
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murder rate was 17 per 100,000 inhabitants.106 Similarly, according to data from 2012, the 
murder rate in Laredo Texas was 36 times lower than the adjacent city of Nuevo Laredo.107 
These statistics lead to the conclusion that, at least for the border region of the United 
States, cartels weigh their actions so as not to create second or third order effects on their 
business model. 
By comparison, ISIS and al Qaeda view the United States from a different lens than 
the cartels. From a strategic perspective, both groups view the United States and its people 
as the enemy and a target. As such, for ISIS or al Qaeda, tranquility in the United States 
has no value to their strategies or ideologies. Al Qaeda’s intent to target the United States 
is apparent in an undated letter to the American people that was acquired during the raid of 
Bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The letter states, “The United States shall 
pay for its arrogance with the blood of Christians and their funds.”108 The continued 
attempts by al Qaeda post September 11, 2001, to target the United States adds further 
credibility to it being a strategic objective of the organization. 
ISIS differs from al Qaeda in the precedence it places on attacking the United 
States. For ISIS, the establishment and maintenance of the Islamic State, as their name 
suggests, is of the highest strategic importance.109 Organizationally, ISIS desires to live by 
Sharia Law, to do so, the state requires a caliph, physical territory to enforce Sharia Law.110 
Additionally, territory provides the caliph a physical domain to establish a total society and 
a legitimization of authority.111 Simply, if ISIS “loses its grip on its territory in Syria and 
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Iraq, it will cease to be a caliphate.”112 As such, the targeting of the United States is not an 
integral component of its ideology or grand strategy of establishing an Islamic State; 
however, the disruption of the United States can be considered an ancillary objective – 
perhaps considered as a projection of power and a tool to mobilize resources. A recent ISIS 
propaganda video from August 2017, shows a young boy directly addressing President 
Donald Trump stating that ISIS’s battle, “‘is not gonna end in Raqqa or Mosul’ but rather 
‘in your lands.’”113 Adding further credibility to where the priorities of ISIS reside, are the 
facts that followers of ISIS have been noted as burning their passports upon arriving in 
Syria; an action that does not suggest an intent to return to the Western countries for future 
attacks.114 Simply, the United States is not entirely absent from its strategy, it is just not 
the top priority. 
The role that the United States plays within the strategies of al Qaeda and ISIS vary 
greatly; however, both organizations, albeit different, see some value in disrupting or 
portraying the United States as the enemy. In contrast, Mexican drug cartels appear to 
prefer to keep the violence within the United States at minimal levels so that it can be 
maintained as a sanctuary and open market.  
C. CONDITIONS AND CONCESSIONS FOR COOPERATION UNLIKELY 
Other organizational perspectives and environmental conditions can certainly be 
considered in determining the likelihood of cooperation between a Mexican drug cartel and 
ISIS or al Qaeda (topics and factors that will be discussed in subsequent sections of this 
thesis). However, when looking exclusively at how each organization views the United 
States, significant hurdles would need to be overcome for cooperation to occur. First, in 
deciding to cooperate or not, if found out, it is fair to assume that the response of the U.S. 
government would be to increase pressure on both organizations and particularly along the 
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United States’ Southwest border. In turn, this would threaten the supply chains, market, 
and safe haven that the United States provides to cartels.  
D. SCENARIO 1: ISIS OR AQ KEEPS THE UNITED STATES WITHIN ITS 
STRATEGY 
Because money rather than ideology is the prime motivator of drug cartels as 
opposed to terrorist organizations, the increased risk to cartels would have to be offset with 
enough capital to make the cooperation beneficial. How much money would be required is 
nearly impossible to calculate. However, if the United States represents 19–29 billion 
dollars of revenue annually for the cartels, and if this revenue is divided equally among the 
seven major cartels of Mexico,115 then at a conservative estimate each cartel gains 2.7 
billion dollars from the United States annually. If this number is adjusted for just the three 
dominant cartels operating within the United States (Sinaloa, Gulf, and Juarez Cartel) then 
the estimate of annual revenue gained from the United States conservatively increases to 
6.3 billion dollars. An unlikely scenario, and setting aside the intangible benefit of the U.S 
being a safe haven, unless the terrorist organization could convince cartels to deviate from 
their profit motivated mindset, the terrorist organization would have to bring a significant 
amount of money to the table for them to jeopardize what the United States represents to 
them. Provided that cartels did not change their strategic outlook on the United States, the 
amount of money that would entice a cooperative relationship to occur between the groups 
may be reduced if the shadow were long enough: making a cooperative relationship 
sustained as opposed to a single occurrence. The problem with this however is it would 
represent a significance hedge on behalf of the cartels that could jeopardize their long-term 
and largest market—The United States. 
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E. SCENARIO 2: ISIS OR AQ REMOVES THE U.S. FROM ITS 
STRATEGIC NARRATIVE 
To reduce risk to the relationship, perhaps cooperation could occur between 
Mexican drug cartels and AQ or ISIS if the terrorist organizations publicly negated their 
interest in targeting the United States as part of negotiating the relationship. However, as 
outlined above, if the relationship were with al Qaeda, this would represent a significant 
divergence from their strategic narrative and diminish its global image. This is a very real 
threat to AQ given that it has experienced a loss of global support over changes in strategies 
that resulted in the fracturing of Al Qaeda in Iraq and the spinning off of ISIS as an 
organization. If the relationship were between ISIS and the cartel, this would have a similar 
effect, but given its focus on establishing an Islamic State, conceptually a narrative could 
be formed to support this.  
If this were the case, it is unclear what could entice the cooperative relationship in 
the first place. For the terrorist, money or resources flowing from the cartels to the terrorist 
organizations would be one answer; however, once again this amount of resources would 
have to be enough to overcome the benefits that including the United States as a target 
provides to the mobilization of resources already. For ISIS, this appears to be an easier 
hurdle to overcome as opposed to al Qaeda. 
ISIS’s monthly revenue in 2015 was believed to be $81 million per month and as 
of June 2017 is believed to be around $16 million a month.116 Multiplying this number by 
12 gives a current annual income of $192 million. By comparison, al Qaeda’s annual 
budget, as of 2010, has been estimated at between $30–$50 million.117 ISIS’s funding 
predominately is generates through the “taxation of the people under its control, 
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confiscation of goods, oil smuggling and production, and trade in illegal antiquities.”118 
Whereas al Qaeda funding is heavily reliant on private donation from the Gulf States.119 
These funding lines and numbers provide some insight for both catalysts for 
cooperation and blocks. First, ISIS is suffering from a loss of revenue and does not appear 
to be reliant on a strategic narrative of the targeting of the west for revenue mobilization—
at least not at this time. Even though, ISIS may be need of expanding its funding sources, 
its economic goals are to be “devoid of outside influence, in order to protect the movements 
credibility, legitimacy, and authority.”120 With this in mind, in theory, ISIS may be able to 
cooperate with a cartel as well as have the financial need to cooperate, but from the 
economic model employed by ISIS does not suggest a fit in establishing cooperative 
relationships with outside groups – let alone a Mexican drug cartel. 
Al Qaeda on the other hand, because its reliance on private donations for funding 
is not in a position to comprise its anti-American strategic narrative. Additionally, from the 
perspective of a strategic outlook on the United States, in looking at annual incomes, it 
appears as though it could potentially cost the Cartels less money to remove the United 
States from the ISIS strategy than it would for ISIS to pay off the cartels to keep it on the 
table. Lastly, without adjustment for other benefits, unless the relationship were indefinite 
and the amount of money the cartels paid to al Qaeda exceeded what they received from 
private donations – al Qaeda cannot remove the intent to target the United States from its 
strategic narrative. Further compounding the problem is trying to determine what would 
bring the cartels to seek this type of cooperative relationship in the first place. For the 
Cartels, perhaps the promise of opening new markets, but the cartels have already deeply 
penetrated the global markets nor do cartels need to rely on terrorist organizations to open 
up new markets. To date without the support of AQ or ISIS, the Sinaola Cartel alone has 
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penetrated market places in 40 different countries.121 Yet, the initial investment on behalf 
of the cartels, given the annual budgets of the terrorist organizations are relatively low 
compared to the cartel revenue, the risk of investment may generate enough return to entice 
a cartel to entertain a relationship. 
Even though this may appear to be a better deal for the cartels, perhaps it is not. 
First, regardless of where or to what extent the cooperative relationship occurred, if found 
out, state retaliations would occur on the Southwest border and within the United States: 
having an effect on their existing U.S. markets. Considering that the cartels are deliberate 
in maintaining a level of tranquility within the United States this would make cooperation 
counter to cartel strategy. Second, if terrorist groups shifted focus away from the United 
States, this may represent more available resources to fight America’s war on drugs. Under 
this scenario, al Qaeda or ISIS loses portions of its strategic narrative, and the cartel again 
places itself in a compromising position. This scenario represents an abandonment of 
strategies for al Qaeda or ISIS (more so for al Qaeda than ISIS) and risk to the cartels. 
Thus, creating a losing scenario for both the terrorist group and the cartel—which makes 
its probability of occurring that much further from reality. 
F. CONCLUSION 
 Even among likeminded people, cooperation in any environment is incredibly 
difficult to accomplish. This problem is even more difficult to achieve when the strategic 
outlook of two organizations attempting to cooperate vary significantly. As shown in the 
above background information, and strategy regarding the United States Mexican drug 
cartels and ISIS or al Qaeda do not see eye to eye making the issue of U.S. strategy nearly 
irreconcilable. This section looks exclusively at the issue of the role that the United States 
plays within the strategies of the organization. Admittedly, it is an oversimplification of a 
scenario with far more variables (to be discussed in additional sections of this thesis). 
However, because an organizational strategy is so paramount, it does provide a 
foundational baseline. Additional analysis in the subsequent sections of this thesis provides 
                                                 




a comprehensive perspective of the potential for a cooperative relationship between the 
groups. Issues regarding ideology, trust, and organizational structure which are discussed 
add depth to comprehending the likelihood of this cooperative relationship occurring. 
However, from a single lens of organizational strategies, it can be conclusively stated that 
significant compromise would be required on the role that the United States plays within 
the organizational strategies of cartels and ISIS or AQ to achieve cooperation – 








III. ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY: 
VITAL BUT A BARRIER TO COOPERATION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
According to Forbes Magazine, “trust is the core foundation of successful 
companies.”122 For terrorist organizations and drug cartels alike, creating trust within the 
organization is imperative given the illicit nature of their activities. Cartels and terrorist 
groups alike must be able to trust its members because of the adverse consequences that 
defection at the individual level may have on the organization as a whole. Additionally, 
because terrorist organizations and cartels operate within an illegal realm they are unable 
to rely on state or institutional support in the enforcement of policies, agreements, or 
acceptable practices; increasing the value that trust has within the organization. To 
establish trust within a cartel or terrorist group by creating a shared identity the 
organization increases the level of trust between members. As such, these organizations 
rely on practices that create a shared organizational identity that in turn generates the 
critical element of trust for the illicit organization.  
As one example of how important ensuring trust exist within a drug Cartel, the Los 
Zetas have been known to publicly hang individuals and leaving behind messages to “cartel 
turncoats or to dealers who sell to the wrong groups.”123 Similarly, and drawing parallels 
with the corporate sector, Shapiro notes that terrorists face issues with creating trust within 
their organizations “common to more mundane organizations such as business firms.”124 
The primary method of creating trust within these illicit organizations is through a process 
of inculcating individuals into the organization’s identity. By doing so, the individuals 
become ingrained and often inescapably joined to the organization. The following section 
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establishes that cartels, AQ and ISIS use very similar methods of indoctrinating individuals 
into the organization’s identity to gain trust and cohesion amongst members; however, in 
doing so, the nature of this process is counterproductive to creating potential inter-group 
cooperation between cartels and AQ or ISIS. 
B. MEANS OF BUILDING TRUST AND SHARED IDENTITY IN CARTELS 
AND TERRORIST GROUPS 
One means in creating group solidarity and ultimately trust within illicit 
organizations is the integration of a religious component within the organization’s identity. 
Al Qaeda, ISIS, and cartels often employ similar methods in creating trust and group 
identity within their organizations through the establishment of shared religiosity. In both 
cases, the cartels and terrorist groups present modifications to established religions in a 
way that fits the organization’s objectives. Islamic radicalization is the process within 
terrorist organizations such as AQ or ISIS to accomplish these goals. For AQ or ISIS, 
radicalization represents a process of “internalizing a set of beliefs, a militant mindset that 
embraces violent jihad as the paramount test of one’s conviction.”125 Cartels on the other 
hand, as one method of creating a shared identity, since the 1980s have created a similar 
effect through the establishment of narcocultos.126 To substantiate the claim of similarities 
in how religion is used by cartels and terrorist groups alike, Mexican Police Commissioner, 
Facundo Rosas commented that: 
An “explosive mixture” of religion and criminal activity…[wherein] 
religious elements are used by criminals as a way of seeking divine or 
supernatural protection that will intercede with God on their behalf, and 
thereby expiate their sins..[in this way]...criminal organizations in Mexico 
are following the pattern that has been used by armed groups with political 
or ideological goals such as those in the Middle East.127 
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In addition to this comment, the Huffington Post notes that, “so just as ISIS and Al 
Qaeda terrorize the Middle East and beyond in the name of Islam, certain drug cartels have 
appropriated” the use of “folk saints.”128  
Narcocultos align with the conventional definition of a cult in which, “a group of 
individuals whose belief and/or practices are unorthodox or extreme in nature.”129 The role 
in which the narcocultos play within the cartels is noteworthy and spans across cartel 
organizations. Marijuana growers are known to petition San Judas Tadeo for prosperity.130 
The Sinaloa, Sonora, and Juarez Cartel are all know to pay respects to the unofficial Saint, 
Jesus Malverde (also known as the “The Mexican Robin Hood” or the “Angel of the Poor”) 
praying him to for safe border crossings and placing his image on drug packaging.131 
Additionally, ‘El Chapo’ has been suspected of closing streets in the past to pray at 
Malvarde’s gravesite.132 Santa Muerte provides another example of the integration of 
religion within the narco-lifestyle. Cartel members often pray to Santa Muerte for 
protection prior to committing a murder, as well as for general vengeance against 
enemies.133 The proliferation of the narcocultos, particularly those that pay homage to 
Santa Muerte is alarming. As noted in Narcos over the Border, “approximately 40% of 
those in Mexican jails are devotees [to Santa Muerte] with inmates exhibiting tattoos, 
amulets, and charms with the saint’s likeness.”134 
La Familia Michoacana (La Familia) has been noted as the most extreme version 
of integrating religiosity within a cartel.135 La Familia is known to employ an “Christian 
evangelical belief system” that “espouse fringe belief” through strict enforcement measures 
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of the Cartel’s founder, Moreno ‘The Craziest One’ Gonzales.136 Given the extent and 
focus that La Familia places on creating an identity grounded in a cult religion, it has had 
great success in forming organizational cohesion and trust. It has been noted by drug 
trafficking expert, Raul Benitez that: 
La Familia uses religion as a way of forcing cohesion among its members. 
They are building a new kind of disciplined army that we have never seen 
her before. It makes them more dangerous.137  
As shown  by Rosas, the integration of some form of religion by the cartels provides 
a level of justification for the illicit activities; however, simultaneously the integration of 
religion is an additive to the identity of the cartels—rationalizing behaviors and creating 
cohesion, two effects that provide contribution to intra-cartel trust. 
A second method of creating trust and an inescapable relationship between cartels 
and their members is through training camps; participation in violent crimes which trap 
members within the organization, and its value system; and the targeting of impressionable 
youth as members. The case of Rosalio Reta and Gabriel Cardona, former hitmen for the 
Los Zetas, highlight the previous characteristics within the cartel recruiting and trust 
building process. While being interviewed, Reta commented that he was first brought into 
the Los Zetas at the age of 13 by two friends, at which time the Los Zetas leader, Miguel 
Trevino presented him with an ultimatum of murdering a person or face his own death.138 
Reta decided to kill the individual, and event that forever changed his life and a “13 year 
old assassin was born.”139 Cardona, experienced what appears to be a similar recruitment 
ultimatum when he was interrogated by Trevino while Trevino played with a hand 
grenade.140 Shortly thereafter the interrogation, and impressed with Cardona’s personality, 
Trevino assigned Cardona as a “probationary foot soldier” in a training camp in 
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Tamaulipas.141 While attending this training camp Cardona was instructed to leave his 
personal belongings at home, and was given a uniform to look like the other recruits, “in a 
symbolic shedding of skin”142 Additionally, training camp activities included the killing of 
captured rivals, to further inculcate the individuals into the organization and a “progressive 
exposure to violence”143 and ultimately build bonds between the organization and the 
individuals.  
ISIS and AQ have used similar techniques in their recruitment and training camps 
for the same end-state of building trust and bonds within the organization. As of 2016, ISIS 
has increased its recruitment and dependence on juvenile members, “known as the Cubs of 
the Caliphate.”144 Much like Cardona and Reta’s experiences, “when the Islamic State 
trains the Cubs of the Caliphate, children are instructed to decapitate a doll, then to watch 
while a human is decapitated, then to decapitate a human themselves.”145 Furthermore, 
much like a cartel training camp, AQ training camps are used to bond “through shared 
beliefs and hardships” and gain combat and advanced training experiences.146 
Regardless of being a cartel or a terrorist organization such as AQ or ISIS, the effect 
of this exposure to violence and indoctrination through training camps is the same. Without 
additional context, it is difficult to ascertain which groups the following quotes can be 
attributed to. One ISIS fighter commented on Twitter, “Cant wait for that feeling when U 
just killed some1.”147 In an eerily similar way, during a police interview Rosalio Reta 
commented that killing someone made you feel like superman.148 The end result from the 
indoctrination process appears to be a mirror image between a cartel and a terrorist 
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organization. Jenkin’s while testifying to the Committee of Homeland Security, in 
reference to AQ, called this indoctrination a process of “transforming oneself into a weapon 
of Jihad.”149 Whereas Slater in “Wolf Boys” refers to Cardona’s transformation into a cartel 
hitman as becoming ‘a heat-seeking missile of black-market capitalism to be deployed 
against anyone who ran afoul of the Company.’150 
Based on the above examples and case study, one finds little difference in the 
approaches that terrorist organizations and cartels use in their processes of building a group 
identity and trust through an indoctrination process. This similarity superficially may 
suggest that the commonality in indoctrination practices make the organizations more like-
minded that initially expected. However, while the indoctrination practices of each group 
bring them closer together, the actual effect of the indoctrination process polarize cartels 
and groups such as ISIS or AQ, which will be discussed in the following section.  
C. THE EFFECTS OF BUILDING INTER-GROUP TRUST AND A 
COHESIVE GROUP IDENTITY 
Social science research and experimentation has shown that group identity has 
significant impact on relationships both internal and external to an organization. Figure 1 
provides a visualization of the conclusions of Pan and Houser in that, “people often 
cooperate with members of their own group, and discriminate against members of other 
groups…and that these groups demonstrate in-group favouritism”151 In addition to this, 
and experiments have shown that “hostilities towards out-groups appears to be particularly 
potent” and that “members of a group will choose among distributions of a resource in a 
way that discriminates against members of the out-group rather than simply benefitting 
members of the in-group”152 While these studies admittedly apply broadly to human 
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behavior, it is reasonable to believe that these same effects occur within illicit organizations 
especially when the specific behaviors of cartels and terror groups are analyzed.  
 
Figure 1.  Effects of Group Identity on Cooperative Relationships 
The purpose of indoctrination in illicit organizations (either a terrorist group or a 
Mexican drug cartel) is to “draw the individuals into a group dynamic”153 and “establish a 
cover (closed) network right from the start and dissolve and integrate all of its supporters 
in this network so that they become an indispensable part of the organization.”154 To do so, 
the group leverages group dynamics through training to change the an individual’s “ideas, 
senses, and attitudes”155 towards a direction that aligns with the larger organizations 
identity. As such, “there is no place for individualism in an organizational group” and those 
who defect are assigned “humiliating adjectives such as ‘fake’ or ‘traitor’.156 These 
attributes are readily apparent in the above-mentioned cases. The way in which the Los 
Zetas brought Cardona and Reta into the organization, how the Los Zetas have left 
messages on publicly hanged individuals, and how the La Familia uses printed press in 
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their indoctrination process all exemplify the deliberate design of the indoctrination 
process. The end result is the creation of “a wall between the members and the outer world 
through constructing a new world” and making the individual another “spoke in the 
organizational wheel.”157  
Throughout this entire process, the cartel and the terrorist organization alike create 
an environment that alters the psychological perception of its members so that they 
categorize people in a binary way. People are either part of the illicit organization or not 
through “exaggerating the differences between the in-group and the out-group.”158 While 
this may appear to a vast generalization on the radicalization or indoctrination process, it 
has been substantiated. As reported by the Huffington Post, Canadian Officials in the study 
of radicalization process have identified ten behavioral shifts that occur in people who have 
undergone the process of radicalization.159 In all cases, the individuals studied showed 
some if not all of the behavioral changes identified and associated with the withdrawing 
from previous social groups with a gravitational pull towards the violent group 
tendencies.160 Furthermore, Vergani and Collins note that one of the distinguishing 
characteristics of Mexican religious drug cartels is their recruitment strategy of creating “a 
strong group identity through the production of sub-cultures and countercultures that 
distinguish the group from the mainstream society.”161  
In sum, the effect of creating intra-group trust and a group identity appears to 
represent a process in which the individuals withdraws from normal societal behaviors, and 
place the organizations value system and identity above self-interest. To accomplish this, 
the illicit organization fosters distrust of outside institutions and value systems, whereby, 
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it becomes difficult for the individual to defect from the organization and the organization 
strained to cooperate with others. 
D. SCENARIO 3: TRUST AND IDENTITY ISSUES IN COOPERATION  
Considering how much value AQ, ISIS or drug cartels place on creating intra-group 
trust among its members through a shared identity in a closed system, external cooperative 
relationships run counter to these organizations identities. Because some level of trust is 
required among cooperating organizations, creating a cooperative relationship for AQ, 
ISIS, or drug cartels would represent a paradigm shift from their modus operandi. If a 
cooperative relationship were to occur, both the terrorist organization and the drug cartel 
would have to expand their sphere of trust, which would constitute trusting individuals 
outside of their specific group identity – an action that runs counterproductive to the 
original objective of making intra-group trust and the group identity an imperative. No 
matter how small, in doing so they would sacrifice a portion of their particular identity 
obtained and fostered through its closed network. Additionally, even if creating a 
cooperative relationship makes economic sense, or creates greater efficiency, drug cartels 
are known to place a greater premium on security over pragmatic approaches (which is 
directly related to the issue of trust) in maximizing opportunities.162 For these varied 
reasons, cooperative relationships within the world of criminality tend to exist (or are more 
successful) when strong “social links” (share identity) underpin the connection.163  
With this in mind, the nature of a cooperative relationship between a cartel and a 
group such as AQ or ISIS would have to provide (a) large enough incentive structure for 
each organization to overcome the risk associated with trusting an external organization, 
and (b) enough benefit that the group was willing to compromise on the level of cohesion 
it gains through fostering skepticism of outside individuals and organizations, and the 
isolating its members from competing norms. Even under the above outlined conditions, if 
cartels decided to compromise some portion of their shared identity to achieve a 
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cooperative relationship with AQ or ISIS, this would represent the sacrificing of a key tool 
employed in the pursuit of its strategic imperatives of “maintaining a favorable business 
environment, motivate organizational members and effectively recruit new organizational 
members.”164 Because continuous group mobilization is required to sustain cartels and 
group identity and intra-group trust enable mobilization, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the sacrifice of group identity to achieve a level of cooperation with AQ or ISIS is low. 
Trusting external groups undercuts the fundamental practices that cartels and terrorist 
groups employ to sustain themselves. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The previous sections have shown that creating a group identity and trust among 
members in AQ, ISIS, or a Mexican drug cartel is an organizational imperative; as such, 
these illicit organizations approach this requirement deliberately and with care. While the 
exact value cannot be calculated, actions to create group identity readily emerge. When 
analyzing behaviors in the context of the likelihood of creating cooperative relationships 
between AQ or ISIS and a Mexican drug cartel, they are counter to producing cooperative 
relationships. This leads to the conclusion that, not only is the value of creating group 
identity high in illicit organizations, but the effects of this process also adversely affect a 
group’s willingness to cooperate externally. 
164 Timothy Klein, “Drug Cartels and Business,” (master’s thesis, Texas Christian University, Fort 




IV. IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE: A HURDLE IN
COOPERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The ideological difference between Mexican drug cartels and AQ or ISIS cannot 
be ignored within the discussion of the likelihood of forming a cooperative relationship. 
As will be discussed later in this section, cartels do not have an ideology in the same sense 
as terrorists; however, they still possess an ideology that is based in an economic value 
system of capitalism. AQ and ISIS on the other hand, center their ideology around its 
Islamic belief system and complementary political systems. While perfect ideological 
alignment, may be neither achievable nor necessary in creating a cooperative relationship, 
the ideological values of the AQ or ISIS remain highly relevant to their organizations. The 
following chapter establishes that a cooperative relationship between AQ or ISIS and a 
Mexican drug cartel would represent major concessions in organizational ideologies. 
Furthermore, given how important ideology is within terrorist organizations, these 
concessions would have the potential for significant adverse effects on their organization. 
This argument is supported by the following: (a) establish the role that ideology plays 
within terrorist organizations, (b) provide broad examples of how compromise in 
ideological values has adversely affected terror organizations throughout history, (c) 
compare and contrast ideological values of ISIS, AQ, and Mexican drug cartels, and then 
conclude with specific organizational repercussions that may result for the creation of a 
cooperative relationship. 
B. DEFINING IDEOLOGY FOR TERRORISM—A DEPENDENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
Terrorism by definition cannot occur without a supporting ideology, but showing 
how terrorism relies on ideology warrants a review of the definitions of terrorism and 
ideology. John Horgan in The Psychology of Terrorism defines terrorism as “a conscious, 
deliberate strategic use of violence against a specific target to affect the political 
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process.”165 Oxford’s definition of ideologies states that an ideology is “a system of ideas 
and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of economic or political theory or 
policy.”166 In both definitions, a reference to politics is present. The dependent relationship 
of the two words is simple. Ideology provides a political value system, or rather the ends 
desired for terrorist organizations. Terrorism provides the means to achieve these political 
ends. Without a desired policy change, violence that produces fear or terror without 
objectives grounded in political policy qualifies as organized crime;167 nor does it fit within 
the constraints of the definition provided by Horgan. While this argument may appear to 
be semantics, it is far from it. Terrorists, while they most likely would not refer to 
themselves as terrorists, would certainly be opposed to be categorized as simple criminals. 
With the integration of their politically based ideology, terrorists distance themselves from 
criminals as well as create a narrative that legitimizes their actions.  
C. IDEOLOGY AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND 
STRUCTURE 
High value targeting operations have become a well-established method for states 
to counter terrorist organizations; however, the success of these operations greatly depends 
on the status of the terrorist organization’s ideology. According to Michael Freeman, 
ideology is the articulation of the vision of a terrorist organization’s leader.168 In cases 
where this ideology becomes institutionalized, the role of the leader then becomes 
diminished, and the value of killing or capturing him thereby is weakened as 
well.169Additionally, the reward of targeting leaders who provide inspiration (a continued 
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articulation of the organization’s ideology) and operational guidance inflicts significant 
damage to the group.170 Lastly, even if a terrorist organization’s leader is highly 
charismatic, the value of ideology cannot be dismissed. Charisma is merely a tool to help 
sell the leader’s ideology to potential members.171Analysis of this thought process 
highlights several key points. First, the leaders of terrorist organizations use ideology as 
the cornerstone for their organization’s narrative. Second, once the ideology becomes 
institutionalized, its value exceeds that of the organization’s leader. Lastly, while a 
charismatic leader is beneficial to a terrorist organization, he still requires something to sell 
and that is his vision or rather his ideology. 
Analysis of the role of ideology in highly networked organizations adds additional 
justification that the value of ideology supersedes leaders in terrorist movements. As 
organizations grow or become more and more networked, the direct accessibility to leaders 
becomes reduced.172 Without access to leaders, the role of ideology drives the process of 
radicalization. As noted by Fathali Moghaddam in reference to cellular terrorist groups, it 
is a process of “immersion in secret, small-group activities leads to changes in perceptions 
among recruits: a legitimization of the terrorist organization and its goals, a belief that the 
ends justify the means, and a strengthening of a categorical us-versus-them view of the 
world.”173 What Moghaddam describes as immersion could be simply stated as the 
adoption of an ideology by a recruit without the presence of the organization’s leader .Even 
further on the spectrum of decentralized terrorist organizations are “lone wolf” terrorists 
who resort to entirely self-radicalization processes. In a study conducted on 119 lone wolf 
terrorists, broader terrorist movement ideologies motivated 77% of the perpetrators.174 
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These statistics show that ideology alone, even in the absence of all other potential 
contributing factors, can drive terrorist acts and behavior.  
D. IDEOLOGY: A SIGNIFICANCE IN GROUP FRACTURING 
Max Abrahms in “What Terrorists Really Want” presents an argument that the 
value and relevancy of terrorist group ideologies are over played because of historical 
examples of groups failing to agree on stable ideological principles.175 He substantiates his 
argument by referring to ETA’s failure to create “a consistent ideology” and Action 
Directe’s “inability to agree on basic ideological principles.”176 Superficially, this appears 
to be a reasonable argument against the value of ideologies in terrorist groups; however, 
from a different perspective, these examples highlight how paramount ideologies actually 
are. Consider it in terms of politics. According to the Pew Research Center, in reference to 
U.S politics, “ideological polarization makes political compromise more difficult, in part 
because those at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum see less benefit in meeting the 
other side halfway.”177 In applying this idea of reaching compromise on ideological values 
to terrorist organizations, ideology is not a moot point to the terrorist. Rather, ideology is 
the most important point to the terrorist; as such, that is exactly why terrorist organizations 
fracture—the value of their ideological principles is so high that they cannot be set aside. 
Brynjar Lia highlights the very point that cleavages exist in terrorist organizations 
over ideologies creates impasses that cannot be overcome, and result in organizations 
splitting. Specifically, Lia refers to the “clash between ideological purists and military 
strategists in al-Qaida”178 with the former preferring accomplishment of the desired end 
states even if some concessions to ideology are made along the way. For Zarqawi, an 
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ideological purist, ideological principles were so fundamental to his vision in Iraq he split 
from al-Qa’ida to form a new terrorist organization—the Islamic State of Iraq. The Shining 
Path provides another observable example of how divisive ideology can be. While in 
prison, the founder of the Shining Path, Abimael Guzman, advocated an ideology that was 
centered on peace negotiations.179 As a result of this, and unable to reconcile ideological 
differences, Guzman’s successor, Oscar Ramirez Durand and his supporting members split 
from Guzman to pursue an ideology grounded in continued violence.180 While this section 
emphasizes how ideology can divide a terrorist organization, the examples still support that 
ideology highly matters, so much so, that it is worth dividing an organizations over. 
E. IDEOLOGY: THE HANDRAIL ON THE RADICALIZATION 
STAIRWAY  
Ideology is a critical factor in the mobilization of human resources for terrorist 
organizations. However, prior to proceeding, it is first important to understand the 
radicalization process, thereby putting the role of ideology in context. As shown on the left 
side of Figure 2,181 Moghaddam posits that terrorists undergo a transformation process in 
which their “psychological interpretation of material conditions” becomes perceived as 
relative deprivation.182 From this stage, an individual evaluates his options for improving 
his repressed status—when legitimate options are limited, the attraction to terrorism 
increases.183 Anger over perceived deprivation and limited mobility options can then result 
in the “displacement of aggression.”184 The individual now possesses the perception of 
deprivation, limited options, and someone to blame, but still must contend with issues of 
morality in participating in terrorist activities. Terrorist organizations mitigate these 
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concerns by fostering an alternative morality in which terrorism is not immoral; rather, the 
enemy is classified as being immoral.185 The individual now views terrorism as not just an 
option to correct his deprivation, but also has a moral backing for it.186 From this stage, the 
individual undergoes a “solidification of categorical thinking and perceived legitimacy of 
the terrorist organization.”187 In doing so, the in group and the out group is firmly 
established in the mind of the individual.188 The last and final stage of the radicalization 
process is the act of terrorism itself that finds foundational justification in all of the 
preceding steps.189 Figure 2 visualizes this process or it can be considered metaphorically 
ascending a staircase.190 
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Figure 2.  The Complementary Effect of Ideology on Radicalization191 
 To continue the use of metaphors, ideology should be considered the handrail on 
the staircase of radicalization. According to Freeman, “ideology provides answers to five 
essential questions: what is the problem, who is the enemy, what is the solution, what are 
the legitimate means to achieve the desired ends, and how does the current fight fit into a 
larger context.”192 The right side of Figure 2 shows these questions in a complementary 
way to assist in the movement from step to step. While the questions inform the process, 
the questions can pertain to different steps. Though the steps are linear, the relevance of 
the questions are fluid in application. What is key is how an individual undergoing 
radicalization is on a path of discovery and seeking answers. Ideology provides the answers 
that are required, allowing an individual to continue radicalizing. To further emphasize this 
point of the interrelationship of radicalization and ideology, both Freeman and 
Moghaddam’s articles specifically call out the value of establishing an enemy. The former 
suggests that ideology “makes distinctions of us-versus-them,” and the latter suggests that 
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by the “fourth floor,” an individual is well within the mindset of “us-versus-them” in his 
transformation into a terrorist.193 In this example, the metaphoric ideological rail continues 
to guide individuals up the steps of radicalization and the codependent relationship of 
ideology and radicalization becomes obvious.  
This section has shown at the macro-level that ideology has significant value at the 
organizational level of terrorist organizations. With these concepts established, the micro-
level, and specific organizational values of ISIS, AQ and cartels can now be placed in a 
better context, for further analysis as well as how these group’s organizational values 
directly oppose each other and may present a significant hurdle in forming a cooperative 
relationship.  
F. SIGNIFICANT IDEOLOGICAL HURDLES TO COOPERATION 
 Cartels, AQ and ISIS diverge so significantly in ideological views that cooperative 
relationships seem highly unlikely. Notably, organizational views on innovation, 
normative behaviors and positional authority all represent potential conflict to achieving 
cooperation. The following section compares these ideological attributes showing not only 
how views differ, but also sometimes compete absolutely.  
G. WORLD VIEWS IMPEDE COOPERATION 
Cartels and AQ or ISIS’ competing lenses present significant obstacles for finding 
commonality that could facilitate a cooperative relationship. First, unsurprisingly, Islamic 
terrorist organizations believe in the moral superiority of Islam.194 As such, according to 
Simons, non-Muslims “can never prove ourselves superior, or even equal, unless we adopt 
their standards.”195 Since most cartel members are Catholic or espouse some version of 
narcocultos, AQ or ISIS see cartels as religiously inferior. Further compounding this issue, 
because religion is so fundamental and superior within ISIS or AQ, how pious their 
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behavior is according to an interpretation of the Quran frames their organizational 
values.196 To substantiate this claim, Mousseau makes the following observation of the AQ 
operatives who executed the September 11, 2001 terror attacks: 
Fifteen of the nineteen hijackers who struck at the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon on September 11, 2001, were from Saudi Arabia, one of the 
richest countries in the world. Most of them were highly educated and 
appeared to have had ample opportunities for building materially rewarding 
lives.197 
With this context, western value systems of material well-being and productivity do not 
resonate with AQ and ISIS.198 
Comparatively, Mexican drug cartels value material well-being the most. A quick 
search of the Internet shows countless photos of cartel heirs and members posing with gold 
plated guns, luxury purses full of money, lavish cars, and exotic animals.199 For the Islamic 
terrorist, this opulence not only represents polar opposite of his value system, but the 
expunging of corrupting influences has also been built into the religious based value system 
since the 7th century.200 Admittedly, Osama Bin Laden and Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman 
attempted to distance themselves from a perceived stigma associated with wealth. El Chapo 
has referred to himself as a “simple farmer” and Bin Laden distanced himself from being 
known as the son of a Saudi billionaire.201 The difference however, is Bin Laden’s image 
of humility was the product of devoted dedication to his extreme religious value system 
and to bond closer to his organization. El Chapo, on the other hand, pursued this narrative 
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only after his first captured to distance himself from cartel activities.202 Without question, 
ISIS and AQ, as opposed to Mexican drug cartels, hold starkly different perceptions on 
how organizations define their value systems. Even more, ISIS or AQ perceive the cartels’ 
value system as being the antithesis of their own.  
How AQ and ISIS view time as compared to cartels may also contribute to why 
these organizational value systems are so divergent. AQ and ISIS and other religiously 
motivated terrorist groups see themselves as engaged in Jurgensmeyer’s so-called “cosmic 
war.”203 He defines cosmic war as “larger than life” with a theory of victory that is “only a 
hope for the distant future” and that “the struggle is blocked and cannot be won in real time 
or in real terms.”204 For cartels, on the other hand, immediate gratification and life in the 
now appear to be consuming themes based on: their lust for consumer goods, “El Chapo” 
being considered old within the drug trade (age 55) at the time of his capture,205 and 
research by the UCLA showing that the drug violence within Mexico has actually reduced 
the life expectancy of men within particular Mexican States.206 Although terrorist and cartel 
members both have a reasonable expectation of an abbreviated life, they view time and the 
meaning of life in remarkably different ways.  
H. INNOVATION AND COOPERATION 
The study of Mexican drug cartels, ISIS, and AQ’s perspectives on innovation 
indicates the unlikelihood of creating a cooperative relationship. According to Australia’s 
Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, “open innovation is a business model that 
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encourages you to collaborate with external partners.”207 As such, envisioning an 
organization seeking to create new external relationships without an innovative 
organizational mindset is difficult. The following section of this thesis outlines the 
organizational perspective of drug cartels, AQ and ISIS on how innovation relates to their 
organizational ideology.  
AQ and ISIS tend to avoid innovation, as it represents a threat to AQ and ISIS’s 
fundamental ideological value systems. To understand this position requires understanding 
the context of its religious ideology. First, according to Mousseau, “some observers argue 
that because the Koran offers instructions ‘for even the minutiae of everyday life,’ Islamic 
culture has tremendous difficulty dealing with change:”208 suggesting an inherent 
resistance to innovation. Similarly, Simons posits that AQ and similar religiously 
motivated terror organizations are “nativist,” which constitutes a belief system that opposes 
Westernization and “a fierce desire to protect corporate Muslim identity.”209 Furthermore, 
nativism “is a response to accommodationist…whose willingness to change abrades on 
certain traditions and beliefs that threaten corporate identity and the way people should 
live.”210 To AQ or ISIS, practices of innovation compete with the societal norms 
established within the Quran, and present a threat to the established order of the group.  
Ultimately at the macro-level, innovation represents perversion of purity of the 
Koran, and as such, resistance at the ideological roots of AQ and ISIS. As an example of 
this, AQ has used propaganda quoting the Koran as, “Whosoever does not judge according 
to what God has sent down, those are the infidels.”211 From the perspective of AQ or ISIS, 
innovation appears to have little value within the organizations’ ideologies.  
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Contrary to the previous paragraphs, some may argue that AQ and ISIS have shown 
a tendency to innovate. Notable examples of terrorist innovation do exist: AQ’s training 
manual, Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants show “a paramount desire to 
become more efficient by learning from the experiences of friends and enemies alike.”212 
Additionally, AQ transformed airliners into guided missiles on September 11, 2001. Lastly, 
ISIS’s equipping of commercial drones with grenades213 all seem to demonstrate 
innovation occurring within the groups. In response to behaviors such as this, Jenkins 
suggests that “terrorist will alter their tactics in an incremental way to solve specific 
problems created by security measures.”214 Furthermore, according to Simons, nativists 
only feel threatened by innovation that “disrupt social relations and thereby morally or 
spiritually endanger them.”215 Classifying tactical changes as innovation or adjustments, is 
somewhat a moot point. What is important to recognize is that AQ or ISIS are willing to 
make organizational change, so long as it does not affect its root ideological values.  
Comparatively, for Mexican drug cartels, innovation does not threaten core values, 
rather innovation appears to be a complementary behavior for organizational ends. Because 
cartels focus on profit maximization, their ideology should be looked at through classic 
economics. For the sake of simplicity, classic economics theory outlines a process that is 
comprised of “rational agents [who] (1) possess stable and consistent preferences, (2) 
compare the cost and benefits of all available options; and (3) select the optimal option, 
that is, the one that maximizes output.”216 Innovation in business which can “help you save 
time and money, and give you the competitive advantage to grow and adapt your business 
in the marketplace” complements cartel ideology. The Los Zetas provide an excellent 
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example of innovation at the macro level within the Mexican Drug trade. The Los Zetas 
beginning in 2002, by integrating absolute brutality and psychological warfare ushered in 
a new era of cartel operations and behaviors.217 According to Logan: 
This criminal brand marked a historical benchmark in Mexico as a time 
when the old school of a ‘gentleman’ drug lord, who would avoid bloodshed 
in the streets and only sell drugs away from children, was over, and the 
beginning of the new school of young drug lords who favored violence over 
discretion had begun.218 
Through innovation, the Los Zetas changed the operating environment of cartels forever. 
While this may be argued to be a tactical innovation, the unprecedented violence in 
Mexico, and the adoption of highly violent behaviors throughout the cartels suggests that 
they are highly innovative at the highest echelons, and the innovation of the Los Zetas 
represents an absolute paradigm change in the conduct of the drug business. In addition to 
this, cartels much like AQ and ISIS, have shown a propensity to innovate at the tactical 
levels. Examples of cartel innovation at the tactical level, to name a few: the employment 
of tunnels, drones, air cannons, catapults, and ultralight aircraft.219 According to Border 
Protection data between 2011 and 2016, upwards of 534 ultralight aircraft and 309 
speedboats had been used in the transportation of drugs across the U.S. border.220 
Additionally, between 1990 and March 2016, 224 drug tunnels had been identified, some 
of which included rail and ventilation systems.221 The mass employment and what appears 
to be continual adoption of innovative methods of transporting drugs into the United States 
not only appears to be highly regarded for cartels but also an imperative in organizational 
practices.  
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I. IDEOLOGY AND POSITIONAL AUTHORITY IMPEDE COOPERATION 
The way in which AQ and ISIS place ideology at a level of moral superiority above 
all other civilizations has been alluded to in previous sections of this chapter. However, the 
topic requires a detailed look, as it presents the most compelling argument for impeding 
cooperation between a cartel and ISIS or AQ. According to Kanter, within inter-business 
cooperative relationships, a mindset of equality between organizations fosters a thought 
process that each of the “parties bring something valuable to the relationship and deserve 
to be heard.”222 If they were to cooperate, this concept seems to be a fundamental problem 
for both Cartels and ISIS or AQ to reconcile. First, as previously established, nativist 
groups such as ISIS or AQ “use morality as the yardstick by which to measure societal 
superiority.”223 Additionally, this fundamental belief appears to be fixed. As Simons 
rhetorically points out, “how can a group of people sure of their moral superiority ever 
submit to anyone else’s moral code?”224 Considering this, cartels under their current 
ideology and normative behaviors cannot create a situation in which they would be equal 
to ISIS or AQ within a relationship without adopting a Islamist world view.225 Because 
issues such as innovation, adaptation, and excessive consumerism are so deeply entrenched 
in the ideological identity of cartels and serve recruitment and a tool to maximize market 
opportunity, the idea of Mexican cartels becoming pious Muslims is laughable.  
J. IDEOLOGICAL COMPROMISE: IS IT POSSIBLE?  
However unlikely it may be, for the sake of argument, let us suppose that ISIS or 
AQ is willing to depart from its hardline position on ideology to achieve cooperation with 
a Mexican drug cartel. Available empirical evidence suggests that doing so adversely 
affects the sustainability and continued mobilization of the groups. Data provided by The 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence from 2015, in 
which they interviewed 58 separate ISIS fighters, showed that “un-Islamic Behaviors” of 
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the group to include: conducting business deals; failing to adhere to group ideals, and 
standards of conduct; and not creating a utopian Islamic society were core motivators for 
defection.226 While the study identified other motivations for defection, “practically all of 
them argued that the group hadn’t lived up to their (political, religious, or material) 
expectations, and that IS’ actions and behaviors were inconsistent with its own claims and 
ideology.”227 Even more recently, and likely partially a byproduct of losing territory (a 
previously established hallmark of ISIS) defection rates amongst ISIS appear to be 
growing. In June 2017, according to Western diplomats, about 150 former foreign fighters 
for ISIS have attempted to return to their countries of origin.228 Even more recent reporting 
from September 2017 suggests that “more and more ISIS members are defecting from the 
terrorist group.”229 Lastly, according a former ISIS member and Saudi national, associated 
with the exodus, “most want to leave, like me. A lot of them realize that the group they 
were with tricked them” and that “there are not many who believe that the people that they 
were with were on the right path.”230 Much like ISIS, AQ has suffered adversely from the 
defection. According to Jacobson in “Why Terrorist Quit,” “Despite al-Qa`ida’s reputation 
for ferocity and secrecy and its purported esprit de corps, many individuals have quit the 
organization.”231 Based on these data points, the organizational ideology creates a form of 
social contract between the group and its members, which causes people to quit when the 
contract is violated. Considering this, and the divergence in ideological value systems, 
cooperation with a Mexican drug cartel would require compromising the social contract 
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between ISIS/AQ and its members. As such, this would result in defections from the group: 
disrupting continued mobilization.   
K. CONCLUSION 
The previous sections have shown how critically important the ideological value 
system is to both cartels and terror groups. While taking different forms, they provide 
shaping of organizational behaviors and create a quasi-social contract between the 
organization and its members. Departures from ideological value systems create intra-
group friction points, which in turn, may result in defection from the organization. As 
previously mentioned, illicit group sustainability requires continuous mobilization of 
resources. One mechanism of continued mobilization is cooperation. Yet cooperation, as 
Kanter points out, requires perceived equality between groups is required. With this in 
mind, AQ and ISIS would violate their ideological value system to work with a drug cartel. 
The specific breaking point that causes defection from ISIS or AQ is unknown and 
individual. Despite this, more than likely, these non-Islamic behaviors are far less 
egregious than those of a drug cartel. To achieve cooperation, requires some level of 
compromise; however, by its very nature, and as pointed out by Simons earlier in this 
chapter, ideology is relatively uncompromising. As a result, cooperation from an 
ideological perspective is unlikely between Mexican drug cartels and ISIS or AQ.    
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V. DECISION MAKNG AND DEFECTION: 
IMPACTS ON COOPERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Understanding where organizational authority and decision making reside in AQ, 
ISIS and cartels can provide significant insight in determining the likelihood, and, if 
possible, at what level cooperative relationships could form between the groups. As shown 
in chapter one of this thesis, attempts to categorize the organizational structures of cartels, 
AQ, and ISIS is highly debated, inconclusive, and fluid. Furthermore, because parallels 
with the formal business sector have been established between terror groups and cartels 
throughout this thesis, and “hierarchy and networks co-exist in all business firms,”232 
attempting to place these organizations in fixed structures, and the strict terms of a network 
or hierarchy is futile. Lastly, as Shapiro points out, an organization can be highly 
interconnected through networks and still retain positional hierarchy.233 Conversely, a 
hierarchy may only exercise control over certain functions and leave the remaining 
responsibilities to subordinates.234 More so than attempting to assign structural typologies 
to these groups, examining the levels at which organizations make decisions may be 
valuable. Because literature frequently correlates the structure type with specific forms of 
decision making, the use of hierarchy and network within this section cannot be avoided; 
however, the main question explored in this section is whether these organizations employ 
a centralized, decentralized or some combination in decision-making. Depending on the 
magnitude of the decision, AQ, ISIS, and drug cartels all show attributes of being 
decentralized and centralized in their decision-making processes; further, creating 
cooperative relationships represents the high end of decision making, thereby making it 
unlikely.  
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B. A REVIEW OF DEFINITIONS  
First, centralized and decentralized authority within an organization must be 
defined. According to Shapiro, a centralized organization is one in which “the center 
directly controls operations and resources.”235 Furthermore, “an organization is 
decentralized when the center provides only ideological guidance and cells self-fund or 
coordinate among themselves regarding operations and resources.” To substantiate my 
arguments on the forms of control these groups use within the organizations, these 
definitions will be applied to the observed behaviors of AQ, ISIS and drug cartels 
throughout the remainder of this chapter.  
C. CARTEL LEADERSHIP AND FRANCHISING 
The image of cartel kingpins calling all of the shots of their organization is a thing 
of the past;236 however, cartel leadership still does exert some control. According to 
Wainwright, “recently some Mexican cartels have begun a radical process of 
decentralization.”237 The decentralization of the drug cartels provides several advantages 
to the organization. First, decentralization “keeps their overhead low and reduces 
potentially risky connections to top management.”238 Second, drug commodities can be 
fragile. As an example, “the coca plant is a fragile plant that can only grow in certain 
latitudes, and so it means that a business model to address this market requires you to have 
decentralized, international production.”239 Lastly, it enables global distribution on a mass 
scale that allows drugs to reach consumers with high levels of certainty and timeliness.240 
Unlike the historical cartels of Colombia that attempted to centrally control all facets of the 
business, Mexican drug cartels have gained organizational and market advantage in these 
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arenas by outsourcing and franchising.241 Franchising for a cartel is similar to that of a large 
corporation in which local businesses are established that benefit from the larger 
corporation’s strategic guidance, branding, advertising, and business model. In return, the 
central organization reaps portions of the smaller business’ proceeds.  
The Los Zetas provide an example of how highly franchised cartels can be within 
Mexico, which in turn decentralizes some, but not all, decision making. According to 
Wainwright, “the Zetas have decided not to send their own representatives into new 
markets to set up criminal outpost from scratch and instead have adopted local gangsters 
in their club, as franchisees.”242 Harvard Business School Professor, Rodrigo Canales 
describes the Zetas franchising in the following way: 
They let people know that they are there, and they go to the most powerful 
local gang and they say, ‘I offer you to be the local representative of the 
Zeta brand.’ If they agree…they train them and they supervise them on how 
to run the most efficient criminal operation for that town, in exchange for 
royalties.243  
While this model suggests a highly decentralized organization, it comes at some cost to the 
franchisee in sacrificing some of its autonomy and control to the core structure of Los 
Zetas. First, under this model, the local cell has to agree to a ‘solidarity pact’ in which “they 
will fight for the Zetas if a war breaks out with another cartel.”244 Second, the cell is 
responsible for protecting the organizational identity or Zeta brand in its organizational 
behaviors. For the Zetas in particular this means that “corporate” Zetas expect that the local 
branch will control all criminal activity, not just the drug trade. Furthermore, according to 
a UN report, “new cells are responsible for preserving the ‘good name’ of the Zetas by 
chastising with violence (death) the use of the Zetas’ trademark by unauthorized criminal 
operators”245 to mitigate free riding from potential competitors. When these quid pro quo 
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factors are taken into consideration, the organization begins to show the attributes of 
simultaneous and delineated centralized and decentralized decision-making authorities.   
Even more telling is the role that the Los Zetas’ history plays within how they 
structure themselves and make decisions. The Los Zetas were a spin off cartel which 
formally represented the enforcement arm of the Gulf Cartel and was predominately 
comprised of Mexican ex-military.246 When the group separated from the Gulf Cartel, 
given its military background, Los Zetas possessed a “chain of command with a very clear 
hierarchy…that allowed them to supervise and operate across many, many markets very 
effectively, which is the essence of what chain of commands seek to do.”247 Based on data 
derived from Campbell and as reflected in Figure 3,248 the Zetas’ organizational structure 
and decision making process show a clear delineation in authority. However, as one moves 
down the structure, authority appears to be less direct. Starting from the top, the structure 
is as follows: (a) The Zetas Viejos are the top leaders within the organization and are also 
original members; (b) Zetas Nuevos “are the enforcers” and “operate on the front lines, 
taking orders from the Zeta Veijos commander under whom they serve;” (c) Cobras 
Nuevos and Lil’ Zetas are new members assigned under the authority of the Zetas Nuevos; 
(d) Productividad are a sub-network of white-collar individuals who conduct cover ups of 
Zeta activity; (e) Halcones serving as intelligence collectors have a loose affiliation to the 
organization.249 Regardless of the perspective, be it from a structural lens or business model 
lens, Los Zetas show both the integration of centralized and decentralized decision making 
processes within the organization design. While the Zetas only represent a single cartel, 
and for that matter a more modern cartel, some of the same hybrid decision making can be 
seen within other and older cartels such as the Sinaloa Cartel.  
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Figure 3.  Los Zetas Organizational Structure250 
These hybrid decision-making structures are not solely the product of new cartels 
such as Los Zetas. The Sinaloa Cartel not only has a long operational history within 
Mexico,251 but also shows some of the same behaviors in decision making and 
decentralization. The Sinaloa Cartel, also referred to as the Sinaloa Federation, as the name 
suggests, encompasses not only cooperative relationships with regional partners, but also 
distributed decision making. Prior to his arrest, El Chapo shared top leadership positions 
with other kingpins such as Ismael Zambada “El Mayo” Garcia, and Juan Jose “El Azul” 
Esparragoza.252 As such, InSight Crime posits that “The Sinaloa Cartel is not a hierarchical 
structure. El Chapo, El Azul and El Mayo have all maintained their own separate but 
cooperating organizations.”253 As a result of this, recent reflections of the cartel have noted 
that the cartel “has developed a reputation for organizational resiliency, often functioning 
like a confederation of allied factions, rather than as a traditional top-down, hierarchical 
cartel.”254 Former DEA agent, Mike Vigil went as far as to say that, ‘they’re pretty much 
like a Walmart or global corporation like McDonalds in that the authority moves through 
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the entire organization, the decision making capability.”255 Much like Los Zetas, the 
Sinaloa Cartel also shows attributes of decentralization through franchising. During the 
course of an interview, Wainwright identified franchising behaviors from within the 
Sinaloa Cartel when a former franchisee of the cartel stated that in the course of doing 
business with in Sinaloa he maintained “freedom to go about their business as they 
chose.”256 While seemingly a clear case of distributed authority throughout the 
organization, some factors still suggest that the top echelons of the organization are critical 
to the decision-making process.  
Despite some decentralization, top positions within the Sinaloa Cartel retain some 
authority. If the Sinaloa Cartel were truly a flat organization with distributed decision-
making, then recent incarceration of El Chapo would have little effect on the organizations’ 
stability. However, El Chapo’s arrest has set off an external power struggle with the Jalisco 
New Generation Cartel. This suggests a level of organizational weakness in Sinaloa. 
Furthermore and internally, El Chapo’s incarceration has created a power vacuum between 
El Chapo’s sons and Ismael “El Mayo: Zambada.257 In the case of the Sinaloa Cartel, 
perhaps the day-to-day decision making is decentralized; however, the positional 
authorities associated with top leadership remain important.  
More broadly and across cartels, an argument for the importance of central 
authorities within the organizations can be made. First, one does not need to look far to 
find publications pointing out the names of founders and current heads of cartels: 
suggesting that these individuals to some degree or another, have a visible presence and 
role within the organizations. Second, Mexico has adopted “king pin” strategies in breaking 
up cartels. Specifically, during his tenure, Pena Nieto’s administration has claimed to have 
arrested or killed 107 of the 122 high-ranking members of organized crime within the 
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state.258 As the drug violence continues, and the flow of drugs appears to go unchecked, a 
counter-argument could be made that these individuals are of low value; however, other 
organizations besides the government place a high value on these individuals. Top figures 
within cartels are not just targeted by the state, but also by rival cartels. As an example, 
during a power struggle, El Chapo had a leader within the Juarez Cartel, Rodlofo Carrillo 
Fuentes killed, and in return, the Juarez Cartel killed El Chapo’s brother Arturo.259 Be it 
from the state or a rival organization, though it may not result in absolute collapse, the 
efficacy of removing cartel leaders is disruptive to organizational stability. This leads to 
the conclusion that the authorities of these individuals transcend figure head status.    
D. AQ LEADERSHIP AND FRANCHISING  
Al Qaeda’s organizational approaches to decision making when compared to a drug 
cartel have a stark similarity but vary from the perspective of brand management and free 
riding. Wilson Center author, Cameron Glenn reflects on the post Bin Laden era Al Qaeda 
leadership authorities in the following way:  
[Ayman al] Zawahiri does not claim to have direct hierarchical control over 
al Qaeda’s vast networked structure. Al Qaeda’s core leadership seeks to 
centralize the organization’s messaging and strategy rather than to manage 
the daily operations of its franchises. But formal affiliates are required to 
consult with al Qaeda’s core leadership before carrying out large-scale 
attacks.260 
In this quote, a level of high-level leadership authority in decision making is shown, but 
also expresses decreased control of decision making among AQ’s periphery. Consistent 
with this theme is that AQ’s metamorphosis from a tightly knit organization into a broad 
ideological movement. According to McCants, “It [AQ] is a portable ideology that is 
entirely fleshed out, with its own symbols and ways of mobilizing people and money to the 
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cause. In many ways, you don’t have to join the actual organization anymore to get those 
benefits.”261 This shows that, AQ as opposed to a drug cartel, such as Los Zetas, is not 
concerned about adherence to a strict organizational brand and potential consequences 
resulting from organizational free riding. Rather, AQ appears to see value in free riding 
because of its greater good of exporting a larger radical Islamic social movement. One does 
not need to look beyond the name of the group to see its organizational perspective towards 
its role. Al Qaeda, from Arabic to English literally translates to “the base,” that can be 
metaphor for other things to grow or be built from. Consistent with its name and this 
organizational design, Burke posits that “one of the original purposes of al-Qaeda was to 
build a coalition of groups around the world and overcome disunity…as one of the 
principal causes of the failure of the militant movements.”262 
 Because AQ, unlike a drug cartel, is not trying to turn a profit and represents an 
ideological foundation, cells and members within the organization develop organically 
without resource requirements from AQ’s core. As such, this minimizes organizational 
impacts at the highest echelons of the organization and therefore mandates minimal 
oversight. This does not suggest that AQ is absolute in decentralizing its decision making 
and its structure. AQ still retains some leadership structure over the entirety of the 
organization which includes: Zawahiri, “a Shura council, as well as committees for military 
operations, finance, and information sharing.”263 Furthermore, this central leadership has 
been responsible for the organizational pivot in priority from focusing on the attacking the 
“far enemy” espoused by Bin Laden to placing a higher priority on Islamic movements in 
what Zawahiri refers to as the “near enemy.”264 It is important to recognize that both 
centralization and decentralization guide organizational decision making, and different 
decisions are made at different levels. As a further example, Al Nusrah Front (an AQ 
affiliate in Syria) received strategic direction from AQ’s leader Zawahiri to focus its efforts 
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on combating the Assad regime in Syria, yet simultaneously used Syria as a planning and 
staging area for core AQ members to conduct attacks on the west, without the direct 
involvement of Al Nusrah.265 What this suggests is that AQ bifurcates organizational 
efforts, and those of greatest importance remain at the highest levels – again showing both 
centralized and decentralized decision making processes of the organization.  
 Specifically, the topic of cooperation for AQ shows that the decision to cooperate 
with other groups is a decision that is held by the top levels of the organization. Within 15 
months of assuming command of AQ, Zawahiri had dispatched core AQ members to Libya 
and Egypt to “build contacts with local networks there and offer them assistance.”266 
Furthermore, Zawahiri established a formal partnership with al-Shabaab, a relationship that 
had been previously rejected by Osama Bin Laden.267 In looking as these particular 
instances, it becomes obvious that the decision to cooperate with other groups comes from 
the top of the organization and depends on the interest and strategy of the core leadership 
positions.  
E. ISIS LEADERSHIP AND FRANCHISING  
ISIS’s decision-making processes are highly centralized but do show some signs of 
moderate decentralization. The most obvious representation of centralization is the 
declaration of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi as the Caliphate. The supreme authorities of the 
Caliph are highly relevant because the of rigid adherence of the organization to its 
ideological value system. According to the Wilson Center, “the caliph has virtually 
unchecked authority.”268 While ISIS does include a Shura Council (much like AQ) that can 
remove Baghdadi from power, his power in reality remains unchecked because he appoints 
all members of the council.269 Despite the authorities of the Caliph, given ISIS’s vastness 
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and performance of state like functions within Iraq and Syria some decentralization in 
decision making is required. As such, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism describes ISIS’s management as “a matrix structure, or an 
organization with complex command systems characterized by multiple lines of 
authority.”270 Figure 4271 shows how functional area authorities are established within ISIS. 
While this may appear to grant high levels of autonomy to both regional commands, and 
in particular areas of functional decision making, the authority of the Caliph over the entire 
structure remains intact. To this point, it should be noted that “directives from the Central 
leadership team and the Caliph still need to be communicated”272 throughout the entire 
organization. Additionally, this dissemination is so important to the organization, that a 
specific council handles it. The Security and Intelligence Council is responsible for 
managing “communications to ensure that the top management team a) has direct 
knowledge of potential plots and b) can deliver critical messages across geographic 
boundaries.”273 This model allows ISIS organizational nodes to have some autonomy and 
increase its survivability,274 yet ultimately remains under the authorities of the central 
system. 
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Figure 4.  Leadership and Structure of ISIS275 
Unlike AQ and more like drug cartels, ISIS guards against free riding behaviors by 
closely controlling its brand management. With the expansion of ISIS’s periphery beyond 
Syria and Iraq coupled with the accessibility of the Internet and social media, brand 
management has become all that more important to the organization.276 To address this, 
ISIS exerts control over brand management through its Media Council and the management 
of ISIS cooperative relationships from centralized control.  
ISIS’s Media Council contributes to its organizational image and branding in 
several ways. First, according to Whiteside, “IS puts its most talented commanders into the 
media department,”277 which validates the value that the group places on managing 
branding and its organizational image. Second, ISIS’s “media leadership created the 
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boundaries of acceptable levels of violence and justified their use with religious citations, 
in effect virtually training its subsidiaries.”278 Lastly, as a means of ensuring quality control 
and preservation of the correct ISIS image, “the media department serves a key role in 
validating media, disputing fakes, and developing external surrogates who can assist in 
policing frauds.”279 Similar to the example provided regarding the Los Zetas and its 
franchise management, ISIS to is highly concerned about the preservation and maintenance 
of its public image and does so through centralized control.  
In addition to ISIS’s Media Council contributing to brand management, the top 
echelons of the organization closely manage cooperative relationships that can be 
considered as franchises. Much like AQ and Mexican drug cartels, ISIS top leadership 
retains all authorities that pertain to the establishment of cooperative relationships or 
franchises. Several historical franchises substantiate the centralized control of cooperative 
relationships by the top echelon of the organization. When a terrorist organization offers a 
pledge of bay’a to ISIS it is offering a pledge of allegiance to the Caliph.280 Upon 
acceptance of this pledge ISIS formally brings the group under the Caliph’s authorities.281 
In this way, these groups represent a franchise of the organization; however, the nuance is 
it is a bottom up rather than a top down directed franchise (that is more common in the 
Mexican drug cartels).  
Many terrorist organizations around 2014, to include Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) and 
various other terrorist groups in both Arab and non-Arab countries made pledges of bay’a 
to ISIS; however, these pledges were not universally accepted.282 On November 13 2014, 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi made a speech accepting some, but not all, of these pledges of 
bay’a.283 Al-Baghdadi did not accept TTP at this time, and conditionally accepted pledges 
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from organizations based in non-Arab countries.284 The conditional basis included: “1) the 
appointment or recognition of leadership by the Islamic State and/or 2) the establishment 
of a direct line of communication between these groups and the Islamic State so that these 
groups could ‘receive information and directives from [al-Baghdadi].’”285 In the case of 
Boko Haram, in July 2014, the organization expressed broad support for ISIS without 
expressing bay’a towards the group.286 As such, it was not until March 13, 2015 that a 
formal relationship between ISIS and Boko Haram became established after the leader of 
Boko Haram, Abubaker Shekau officially pledged bay’a to ISIS on March 8, 2015.287 
Additionally, it should be noted that the acceptance of the relationship by ISIS came from 
an official spokesman of the organization.288 Lastly, perhaps coincidently but unlikely, the 
organizational relationship between ISIS and Boko Haram occurred only after Boko 
Haram’s media practices closely resembled that of ISIS.289 
These case studies provide several interesting insights into how the organization 
manages its cooperative relationships. First, based on pledges of bay’a not being 
universally accepted from organizations within Arab countries, ISIS is cautious of who it 
cooperates with—even in instances of close ethnic alignment. Second, for organizations 
that are not based in Arab countries, the central authorities place additional mechanisms of 
control over the cooperating group to ensure compliance with ISIS’s identity. Third, in all 
of the mentioned cases, the central authorities of ISIS specifically control the establishment 
(or not) of the relationships. Fourth, parity between Boko Haram’s media management and 
that of ISIS may have provided confidence for ISIS that its organizational brand would be 
preserved in the relationship.   
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F. MANAGING AGENCY: THROUGH THE COST OF DEFECTION 
Thus, far, this chapter has focused on where organizational control resides within 
AQ, ISIS, and Mexican drug cartels; however, the topic of how these organizations enforce 
adherence to organizational decision making requires examination. By doing so, a more 
complete understanding of the likelihood of cooperative relations occurring without the 
endorsement of the central leadership of the organizations can be derived. This area of 
focus helps to identify how these violent sub-state groups manage agency. ISIS and 
Mexican drug cartels through their organizational behaviors have shown both the will and 
ability to more strongly punish behaviors of defection more than AQ. 
Mexican drug cartels use the credible threat of violence to achieve adherence to the 
specific rules of the organization. According to the DEA’s Former Chief of International 
Operations, Michael Vigil, orders are often implied or orally communicated and “are 
ruthlessly enforced by ‘lugartenientes’ (lieutenants), better known as plaza bosses. 
Organizational members quickly learn the rules, or they are dealt with violently.”290 While 
this analysis comes from outside the organization, the policy appears to be well understood 
from within the cartels themselves. While being interviewed, a “local Sinaloa Warlord” 
provided the following description and scenario of the cost of violating the orders and 
directives of El Chapo Guzman: 
We just do our job, here we respect the big bosses if we’re told something’s 
wrong we sort it out, we don’t rebel. There’s no point in rebelling against 
El Senor [El Chapo] here. Once or twice people have – people didn’t obey 
El Senor. That was it for them. Let me give you an example, if I take the 
product to the border, move it with my own money, work with people who 
aren’t ours I risk getting a warning and after that’s you dead.291  
Consistent with the perspective of Vigil and the Sinaloa cartel warlord, Wainwright further 
notes that Mexican drug cartels are known for “dishing out their most horrible violence to 
traitors from their own ranks.”292 From three different vantage points, it is readily apparent 
that drug cartels enforce the most extreme cost on defection behaviors within their 
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groups—death. While this appears to be the highest price one can pay from deviating from 
the directives of the organization, the cartels also increase the risk of defection by extending 
the threats of violence to family members to ensure compliance with its outlook.  
While being interviewed, an undercover DEA agent had the following observation 
of how cartels exploit familial ties to ensure compliance in its members. According to him, 
“part of the way the cartels retain control is through fear. Mexicans will cooperate to a 
certain level, but they won’t talk about Sinaloa. They know their family back home will be 
killed.”293 For the cartels, this strategy in controlling individual behaviors has been highly 
successful. According to the same Rolling Stone interview, as of 2011, “Senior DEA agents 
acknowledge privately that they have yet to flip a single significant snitch from the 
cartels.”294 Simply, because of cartel control and punishment mechanisms—“Mexicans 
don’t flip.”295 
Much like cartels, ISIS shows a strong will and capability in enforcing its 
organizational authorities over its group members. ISIS’s policy towards behaviors that 
defect from the core leadership’s authorities is apparent in ISIS’s media release declaring 
al-Baghdadi as the Caliph. According to Milton and al’Ubaydi’s research and analysis 
through the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, the following quote directly speaks 
to ISIS’s policy towards mitigating defection behaviors:  
Be very wary of breaking the ranks. For you to be snatched by the birds 
would be better for you than to break the ranks or take part in doing so. And 
if anyone wants to break the ranks, split his head with bullets and empty its 
insides, whoever he may be.296 
Furthermore, ISIS’s policy is not limited to fiery rhetoric, its organization structure 
enforces this policy and punishes transgressions in behavior of its members. The Hisbah, 
a sub-committee under the Sharia Council or more commonly referred to as the religious 
police of ISIS, is the “civil administration security forces who investigate transgressions 
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and mete public punishment as a deterrent.”297 Adding further credibility to ISIS’s policies 
towards defection, while not confirmed through ISIS press releases, the mainstream media 
has reported that ISIS has beheaded or otherwise killed its own members in Afghanistan, 
Syria, and Northern Iraq as a result of individuals being suspected of behaviors that have 
undermined the organization’s operations.298 As examples of this, in July 2016, ISIS 
ordered the killing of seven of its own members by first bounding their hands and feet and 
then throwing them into boiling water for fleeing a battle.299 Additionally, in June 2016, 
ISIS courts punished 19 soldiers for fleeing a battle by executing them.300 In addition to 
showing the brutality and costs associated with defection, the two examples also show at 
what level the punishment is issued—central authorities of the organization. Much like 
cartels, ISIS has shown not only the will to enforce control throughout its ranks, but also 
the means to do so by punishing deviant behavior with cruel death. As such, much like 
cartels, defection comes at an extremely high cost. 
Al Qaeda’s process to enforce control resembles ISIS and Mexican drug cartels in 
some ways, but also include some softer or bureaucratic approaches. As an example of AQ 
killing their own, in June 2016, AQ in Yemen killed two of its members for espionage; 
however, other media outlets posit “the real reason behind their death was that the two 
wanted to split from the organization and return to Saudi Arabia.”301 The specific reason 
for the killings is moot, the individuals were killed for behaviors outside of the expected 
norms of the group. However, killing people as a punishment mechanism is not the only 
approach the AQ employs to exert its central control.   
AQ has shown a historical precedence to use administrative processes to try to 
maintain control over its group. Shapiro states, “leaders of al-Qa’ida, for example, have 
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attempted to use auditing to check up on their agents.”302 One example of this can be 
derived from a 1999 email correspondence between al-Zawahiri (at the time second in 
command of AQ) and an AQ in Yemen cell leader.303 In the email, al-Zawahiri expressed 
discontent with the cell leader’s spending habits and expense reports.304 While this could 
be considered a low level of defection in behavior, and the response was proportionate 
from AQ central, even larger transgressions have been handled through a war of words.  
Probably the most notable war of words between leadership with AQ was in 2005 
between Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Al-Zawahiri believed that al-
Zarqawi’s tactics of beheading individual was counterproductive to the goals of AQ, as 
such, via written correspondence, he asked al-Zarqawi to stop.305  While al-Zarqawi’s 
response to al-Zawahiri is unknown, based on al-Zarqawi’s public narrative at the time,306 
and the ultimate splitting of ISIS from AQ, al-Zawahiri seems to have been ignored. 
Successful or not in deterring deviant behavior, this exemplifies AQ’s attempt to use more 
than physical force to control the behaviors of its members.   
G. CONCLUSION: ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF AUTHORITY 
ON COOPERATION 
Typecasting AQ, ISIS, or Mexican drug cartels into neatly constructed 
organizational designs such as a hierarchy or a network is debated among scholars. Despite 
this, understanding where, to what extent, and how decisions are made within organizations 
provides valuable insight in understanding the likelihood of these groups forming 
cooperative relationships. Based on the information provided on past cooperative 
relationships, it can be reasonably concluded that if AQ or ISIS were to cooperate with a 
Mexican drug cartel, then the decision would have to come from the top of the organization.  
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It may be argued that in the case of AQ, an organization that does not closely 
manage its franchises, the possibility of decentralizing the decision to cooperate could 
occur at a lower echelon. However, if this were the case, the issues of AQ’s deeply 
entrenched ideology would have to be overcome. While AQ may be more decentralized in 
its organizational decision making, because of its “portable ideology,”307 but as previously 
established such ideology presents its own challenges in forming cooperative relationships.  
ISIS from a decision-making lens appears to have a very low likelihood of forming 
a cooperative relationship with a drug cartel. Examples from this chapter show that when 
opportunities are presented to cooperate with seemingly like-minded individuals without 
ideological barriers, ISIS enters these relationships with a high level of caution out of fear 
of losing control of its brand image. From this, one may conclude that if ISIS finds it 
difficult to cooperate with similar groups, its ability to cooperate with a vastly different 
group, such as a drug cartel, is extremely low.  
Lastly, although the unit of analysis of this thesis is at the organizational level, 
hypothetically, suppose that cooperation occurred without the knowledge of the core 
leadership. Based on the information provided, this seems to be highly unlikely as well. 
First, AQ, ISIS, and Mexican drug cartels all have mechanisms in place to harshly punish 
defection, so the cost of defection is high. However, if an individual believed the cost of 
defection was worth it, this would represent not only defection from the organization’s 
decision-making authorities, but also from the organization’s ideology or identity. This 
would suggest a profile of an individual who believes so strongly in creating a cooperative 
relationship between organizations that the value of the relationship is: (a) worth risking 
his own life, and (b) worth more than the organization’s ideology and identity to the 
individual, and (c) a belief in a cause that does not conform to the expectations of the group 
from which he is defecting. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which this would 
manifest. However, assuming it did, this individual (or group of defecting individuals) 
would cease to represent the groups analyzed within this thesis and is outside this scope of 
research.  
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In conclusion, from the perspective of organizational decision making and the ways 
in which these decisions are enforced, cooperation between a Mexican drug cartel and AQ 
or ISIS remains difficult to achieve. Furthermore, on the off chance that an individual did 
defect to create a cooperative relationship, it would come at significant risk to himself and 









This thesis has studied the likelihood of cooperative relationships forming between 
Mexican drug cartels and AQ or ISIS. This thesis finds that broadly cooperative 
relationships between these groups are highly unlikely. This conclusion has been reached 
through analysis of the following factors: (a) organizational strategies towards the United 
States, (b) group identity, (c) ideological value systems and (d) organizational decision-
making structure and process as well as (e) the conditions that successfully foster 
cooperative relationships within the private sector. Specifically, the following hypotheses 
have been tested and found the outcome that cooperation is unlikely to result between these 
groups. In review, Hypothesis 1 of this thesis is: 
The organizational identity factors of: strategy, ideology, and group identity 
(centered around trust), between AQ and ISIS and Mexican drug cartels 
impede the likelihood of operational cooperation between the groups.  
This hypothesis has been proven true and is summarized in Figure 5. In most instances, the 
factors of compatibility between Mexican drug cartels, AQ, and ISIS seem polar and, in 
some instances, compete absolutely. The most notable is perhaps how the United States 
fits into the strategies of AQ and drug cartels. This divergence in outlook represents a 
significant cleavage between the groups and is simply an irreconcilable difference between 
them: impeding the groups from forming a cooperative relationship. In some instances, one 
group or another is in a position where the group’s outlook leans towards the possibility of 
creating a cooperative relationship. However, because cooperation requires willing 
participation from both parties, the second party’s stance prohibits the forming of a 
relationship. As an example of this, ISIS can afford to remove the United States from its 
strategic narrative, but the relationship with a cartel remains incompatible due to the risk 
that it would pose to U.S. drug markets for the cartels if the relationship were found out – 
regardless of ISIS’ position towards the country. Conversely, cartels could compromise 
partially on their ideology to create an effective relationship with ISIS, but ISIS ideology 
is neither compromising nor will it accept partial conformity. Thus, cooperation would 
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require cartels to conform entirely to ISIS’s ideological values—a scenario that is 
unpalatable for cartels for obvious reasons. Lastly, AQ and drug cartel’s willingness to 
compromise on ideologies for organizational gain seems to be the single highest chance of 
cooperation. However, other factors such as organizational identity and strategic outlook 
towards the United States prohibits the relationship from forming. Myopically, this factor 
appears to present the highest chance of providing a foundation for cooperation, yet the 
other factors are inescapable thus making the relationship unlikely. Lastly, the topic of 
organizational identity, a topic that underpins many of the other factors discussed, 
universally impedes cooperation. According to business literature, trust between groups is 
a requirement to create cooperative relationships. However, in the case of cartels and terror 
groups, while the employ similar tactics to do so, their modus operandi is one that fosters 
in group trust through dissuading trust of out groups. This practice by its very design 
undermines best practices in forming cooperative relationships between groups. 
Furthermore, this practice is fundamental to both groups and the chance of this successful 





Figure 5.  Likelihood of Cooperative Relationships Forming between Mexican 
Drug Cartels and AQ or ISIS 
The validation of Hypothesis 2 further substantiates the author’s thesis statement 
that cooperative relationships between drug cartels and AQ or ISIS is an unlikely outcome. 
Hypothesis 2 of this thesis is: 
Organizational structure decreases the likelihood of operational cooperation 
between the groups.  
While some believe that terrorist groups and cartels are highly networked, and because of 
this decentralized nature the organizations struggle with control of its members. As such, 
the organizations struggle with principle agency problems within the group’s franchises. 
However, this thesis has shown that these organizations cannot be neatly type cast into 
hierarchical or network diagrams. They show the attributes of both. Additionally, this thesis 
also establishes that a networked organization is not necessarily synonymous with 
decentralization in high level decision making. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 5, the 
centralized control in strategic decision making is held closely at the top of these groups. 
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In all cases, the top leadership of these groups employ mechanisms to communicate, 
enforce decisions and policy making, and manage group franchises. Thus, from an 
organizational decision making and structural perspective, cooperation remains highly 
unlikely. Only in the case of AQ does some discretion in authorities exist that allows room 
for cooperation to be created. Yet again, this requires the willingness to participate from 
both parties, and drug cartels simply do not allow that level of autonomy within their 
organizations. 
In conclusion, creating organizational alignment along the factors studied within 
this thesis show significant hurdles to cooperative relationships. In some cases, these 
differences are so paramount to the organization that compromising them is not even a 
consideration. Some categories studied within this thesis may bring these organizations 
closer together to form cooperative relationships. Yet, where one hurdle is overcome a 
different blockade presents itself. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
While the likelihood of cooperative relationships between these groups is highly 
unlikely, if they did manifest, the threat has the potential for catastrophic consequences for 
U.S. national security. Because of this, the author suggests the following policy 
recommendation for consideration. As established, cooperative relationships require 
participation from both parties. As such, a clear and concise narrative targeting a single 
side of the potential cooperative relationship will have the desired effect of deterrence. 
Deterring terrorists, especially AQ and ISIS seems aspirational at best, but cartels who have 
so much to lose from the United States may present a captive audience for a strategic 
narrative. A strategic narrative that specifically targets the cartels should influence decision 
making in their consideration of cooperating with AQ or ISIS. This narrative should 
emphasize the following points: (a) albeit a low likelihood, the U.S. government is aware 
of the potential confluence between these groups, (b) the United States is actively seeking 
to identify relationships between the groups, and (c) if a relationship exists, or is forming, 
it comes with substantial risk and consequence to cartels and their U.S. drug markets. So 
long as this topic remains a perceived interest, the U.S. government can achieve deterrence.  
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C. FUTURE RESEARCH  
Admittedly, this thesis narrowly looks at AQ’s core organization, ISIS, and keeps 
the Mexican drug cartels in a broad context. As such, future research should continue to 
look at other terror organizations, and more specifically into individual drug cartels in 
detail. For example, Hamas has been a widely reported terror organization operating within 
Mexico, perhaps a future question to study is what are the organizational factors that allows 
Hamas greater freedom of movement within Mexico. Similarly, as cited in chapter 1, 
AQIM has been reported to have cooperative relationships with Latin American drug 
producers. Is there something particular about AQIM, as opposed to AQ’s core, that makes 
this relationship work requires in depth analysis. Researching these areas in greater detail 
will either continue to validate or disprove this thesis which contends strategy, identity, 
and ideology highly matter in the formation of cooperative relationships between Mexican 
drug cartels and terror groups.   
Second, this thesis does not attempt to assign values to the organizational factors 
discussed. Perhaps, one factor matters more than another and mitigates shortfalls in one 
particular area. In many ways, this thesis suggests some of the basic premises of game 
theory. It may be worthwhile for future research to apply concepts of game theory in greater 
detail to help to quantitatively explain the likelihood of cooperative relationships between 
these groups. Lastly, while this thesis establishes that direct cooperative relationships 
between these groups is unlikely, further understanding of illicit networks and how they 
overlap through individuals without specific group affiliation warrants research. This topic 
may be of the greatest value to understanding how and when these groups cooperate. If the 
premise of this thesis is accepted, then this last topic may help to identify one of the greatest 
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